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INTRODUCTION
The rise of populism is one of the most significant developments
in contemporary politics.1 This phenomenon can be difficult to
†Professor of Law, SUNY at Buffalo School of Law, and Professor of Law & The A.J.
Thomas Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University College of Law, respectively. We are
deeply grateful for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts during a global pandemic
from Charles Barzun, Mitch Berman, Aaron Bruhl, Michael Coenen, Jesse Cross, Jim
Gardner, Abbe Gluck, Tara Grove, David Fontana, Barry Friedman, Mike Klarman,
Ethan Leib, Jamie Macleod, Jud Mathews, Athena Mutua, David Noll, Jane Schacter,
Kevin Stack, Matt Steilen, Mark Storslee, and Mark Tushnet. We also received generous
feedback at faculty workshops at each of our respective home institutions and when
we were invited to present this project at the third annual National Conference of
Constitutional Law Scholars. Copyright © 2021 by Anya Bernstein & Glen Staszewski.
1. The Cambridge Dictionary even declared “populism” its word of the year in

283

284

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[106:283

capture succinctly: populism does not constitute a uniform political
movement, and the label has been applied to quite different political
movements and moments.2 But commentators generally recognize a
particular, contemporary form of authoritarian populism
characterized by several key traits.3 Populist leaders claim to
represent the will of a morally pure people against a corrupt, out-oftouch, or unresponsive elite.4 They present this “people” as a unified
whole, with a single, undifferentiated will to which the populist leader
claims exclusive, unmediated access.5 Populists use this image—one
leader, one people, one will—to suggest that political questions have
one correct answer: the answer the populist provides.6 They deny the
very possibility of legitimate disagreement and seek to exclude those
who diverge from the populist’s view, labeling them outsiders or even
enemies.7 Populism is thus an exclusionary form of identity politics.8
Populist leaders use this rhetorical frame to claim legitimacy by fiat.
Populism challenges the commitments of republican democracy,
which rests on institutions that mediate the divergent interests of a
pluralistic populace through ongoing negotiation to produce
incremental, provisional responses to the public’s problems.9
Discussions of populism generally focus on politics. This Article
identifies a related phenomenon in law. Judicial populism uses
political populism’s tropes, mirrors its traits, and enables its practices.
Like political populism, judicial populism insists that there are clear,
correct answers to complex, debatable problems. It disparages the
mediation and negotiation that characterize democratic institutions
and rejects the messiness inherent in a pluralistic democracy. Instead,
it simplifies the issues legal institutions address and claims special
access to a true, single meaning of the law.
In this image, there is no room for legitimate disagreement.
Writers in this vein often accuse those who disagree with them of bad
faith or willful blindness. Deploying stock stories and familiar tropes,
2017. Cambridge Dictionary’s Word of the Year 2017, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY: ABOUT
WORDS (Nov. 29, 2017), https://dictionaryblog.cambridge.org/2017/11/29/
cambridge-dictionarys-word-of-the-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/3HJL-U3M7].
2. JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 1 (2016).
3. See infra Part I.
4. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 2–3.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 25–26.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 3.
9. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY (Melvin L. Rogers ed., 2012) (discussing the source of democracy’s legitimacy).
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this rhetoric presents good judging as mostly a matter of using the
correct method. It imagines away judges’ unavoidable participation in
the production of law and relieves them of responsibility for the
consequences of their actions. Because they focus on method, these
stories and tropes can be deployed to whatever substantive ends a
writer wants, while also disparaging those who acknowledge
normative and practical concerns as activist elites imposing their
preferences on the public. Judicial populism thus echoes the antipluralist, anti-institutionalist, and Manichean stance of its political
cousin.
Not all who draw on populist reasoning are populists through
and through.10 Populism provides tropes—standardized ways of
acting and arguing—that people can utilize to differing ends and
extents. Those tropes, moreover, have no special claim to legitimacy
or acceptance; like any approach, they should be evaluated on their
merits. In this Article, we show how populist tropes have made their
way into, and even entrenched themselves in, legal theory. And we
argue that the legal theory of a republican democracy should not
accept, much less submit to, judicial populism.
Part I of this Article briefly sketches the most salient
characteristics of political populism. Part II argues that public law
adjudication and legal theory host an analogous, though previously
unrecognized, judicial populism. In Part III, we survey three areas
where judicial populism has become entrenched through extensive
articulation in well-known theories: textualism, originalism, and
unitary executivism. These theories exemplify judicial populist
rhetoric, insisting on peculiar frames through which to see law,
judging, and democracy.11 Part IV explores how those frames are
constructed: specious claims to minimalism—of legal method and
policy effect—work as a magic ticket out of the normative
contestation that characterizes legal decision-making. A set of stock
stories helps bolster claims to exclusive, unmediated access to the true
meaning of the law that bypasses the institutions of democratic
governance and places the judiciary above the fray of pluralistic
debate. And misusing the familiar syllogistic argument form creates a
veneer of certainty, setting up battle lines for a Manichean contest.
Disassembling the frame shows that, despite its claims, populism
has no monopoly on legitimate legal methods and no special access to
legal truths. Nor, as Part V explains, should a republican democracy
10. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 1–2, 38–39.
11. In a companion work in progress, we explore related manifestations of
judicial populism specifically addressing the administrative state.
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want a theory that did. A republican democracy, we argue, should
embrace judicial approaches that value its commitments and build on
its strengths: pluralism, institutional mediation, deliberation, debate,
and flexibility. Legal thinkers should reject judicial populism’s selfrighteous claim to reflect the only legitimate legal method, and instead
embrace republican democracy in legal interpretation.
I. WHAT IS POPULISM?
With the end of the Cold War, many believed that liberal
constitutional democracy would imminently achieve a permanent,
decisive victory over alternative forms of government.12 But not
everyone benefited from the economic and political upheavals that
followed or from the new orders created in their wake. Populist
leaders seize on the resulting alienation and resentment to empower
themselves instead. Working within democracies, populists use the
principle of popular sovereignty to secure power, but their modus
operandi are profoundly undemocratic.13 Populism comes in many
flavors and can be hard to pin down,14 but scholarship in political
theory and related disciplines has identified its most salient
characteristics.15 This Part draws on that work to present our
understanding of populism and highlight the features most relevant
for our analysis.
The notion of populism we use here focuses on its central
features in contemporary democracies, including the United States.
This contemporary, authoritarian populism trades on a favorable
image from other movements that have borne the same label as a way
to signal a desire to advance the interests of people marginalized or
12. See Aziz Z. Huq, The People Against the Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123,
1123 (2018) (citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 211
(1992)) (“[T]here are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.”).
13. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 44–49 (discussing populist “techniques of
governing”).
14. For example, populism comes in both left- and right-wing variations, and can
be attached to different “host ideologies.” See CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA
KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 21 (2017); Andrew Arato & Jean L.
Cohen, Civil Society, Populism, and Religion, 24 CONSTELLATIONS 283, 286–87 (2017).
And it is internally diverse and complex. See, e.g., David Fontana, Unbundling Populism,
65 UCLA L. REV. 1482 (2018) (arguing that the notion of populism can be unbundled
from the authoritarian and xenophobic dimensions that often accompany it); Nadia
Urbinati, Political Theory of Populism, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 111, 114 (2019) (“Populism
is the name of a global phenomenon whose definitional precariousness is proverbial.”).
15. See generally MÜLLER, supra note 2; Arato & Cohen, supra note 14, at 285–89;
Huq, supra note 12, at 1134 (claiming that Müller provides “the most useful definition
of populism” in the literature); Urbinati, supra note 14.
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ignored by economic and political powers.16 Like those predecessors,
the brand of populism we address here also makes claims justifying
action in the name of “the people.” But because contemporary
authoritarian populism’s defining characteristics are in fact
exclusionary in nature, this version of populism is normatively
problematic and fundamentally undemocratic. In particular, we focus
on three related overarching traits: contemporary authoritarian
populism is anti-pluralist, anti-institutional, and Manichean.
Populists, Jan-Warner Müller explains, “are always antipluralist.
Populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people,” and
that the people themselves constitute a unified whole.17 The populist
thus lays claim to exclusive representation of the whole people. This
discourse is universalizing—the populist encompasses all. But it is
also exclusionary: it does not typically call for greater inclusion of
different kinds of groups into the political process.18 Instead, it claims
to already speak for the whole of the people, which is already
constituted as a unity with one common interest and one shared will.19
Populist claims express seemingly irrefutable, universal truths, even
as they marginalize the experiences and interests of those who do not
fit the story the populist tells.20 The supposed unity of the people casts
divergent viewpoints as illegitimate,21 in contrast to a democratic
conception in which ongoing negotiation among diverse values and
interests are integral. This imagined unity also gives populists a claim

16. Think, for example, of the farmer-labor alliance of the nineteenth-century
Populist Party in the United States, or the “plurinational” populism of Evo Morales. See,
e.g., Michael Kazin, How Can Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Both Be ‘Populist’?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/how-can
-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist.html [https://perma.cc/XH6U
-WB77]; Carlos de la Torre, In the Name of the People: Democratization, Popular
Organizations, and Populism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, 95 EUR. REV. LAT. AM.
CARIBBEAN STUD. 27, 33–36 (2013).
17. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 3.
18. Id.
19. Thus, for instance, Müller argues that members of the Populist Party in the
United States in the late nineteenth century were not really “populists” in the modern
sense, because they sought greater inclusion and equality and did not purport to
represent or speak for all the people. Id. at 85–91.
20. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 9 (Ellen Kennedy
trans., 1988) (footnote omitted) (“Every actual democracy rests on the principle that
not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires,
therefore, first homogeneity and second—if the need arises—elimination or
eradication of heterogeneity.”). Schmitt was a key political theorist of the Nazi regime;
his understanding of democracy closely echoes contemporary populism.
21. Id.
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to clear, correct answers to problems that are in fact inherently
complex and multifaceted.22
Contemporary authoritarian populism is thus an exclusionary
form of identity politics.23 It pits the true people, whom populist
leaders purport to represent, against “others” who do not properly
count as part of the polity.24 The others, who might include political
opponents, bureaucrats and other experts, independent courts, the
mainstream media, transnational organizations, foreign citizens and
governments, immigrants, and members of marginalized minority
groups, are blamed for the nation’s problems and provide a
convenient scapegoat for leaders’ own shortcomings.25 Think for
instance of the slogans “Black lives matter” and “all lives matter.” The
former insists on the value of a group marginalized in political
practice, seeking to bring an excluded participant into the political
fold. The latter also sounds inclusionary because it encompasses “all
lives.” But in context it erases the way that Americans’ experiences of
state power differ in racialized ways. The universality of “all lives
matter” excludes those groups whose lives have, in practice, mattered
less to the systems they address. In the same way, claims to represent
“the people” falter on the fact that a diverse democracy has no one,
unified “the people.” Claiming it does thus excludes experiences,
views, and statuses that populists present as falling outside “the
people” proper—as, in fact, mattering less.
Contemporary
authoritarian
populism
also
has
a
“noninstitutionalized notion of ‘the people.’”26 It rejects the mediating
role of democratic institutions in which divergent preferences can be
expressed and negotiated.27 Populist leaders claim special access to
22. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 25–26 (discussing populist “oversimplification”).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 4; see also Urbinati, supra note 14, at 112 (“While the populist
interpretation of the people stresses the inclusion of the ‘ordinary’ many, this inclusion
occurs through a process of exclusion: The political establishment is the externality
against which populism’s ‘people’ positions itself and without which populism cannot
exist.”).
25. See Arato & Cohen, supra note 14, at 288–89 (“Targeting the separation of
powers, the press, independent courts and the rights of opponents and minorities is a
standard part of the populist playbook . . . [and populists in power] use ‘participatory’
media to constantly attack the professional accredited press, to discredit science, [and]
established facts as well as fact checking that may challenge the populist leader’s
claims and bona fides.”).
26. See Huq, supra note 12, at 1133–34 (quoting MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 31)
(discussing the second main element of Müller’s conception of populism).
27. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 32 (“[T]he problem is . . . always the institutions
that . . . produce the wrong outcome.”).
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the people’s will, which democratic institutions allegedly miss, ignore,
or distort.28 This view again presupposes a unified body with “a single
and morally-privileged . . . will,” which the populist leader is uniquely
capable of discovering.29 This aspect of populism implies that popular
self-rule can be achieved only through the populist’s leadership—one
reason populist leaders routinely claim to return power to the
people.30
Populists seize on the inherent messiness of republican
democracy—its separated powers, checks and balances, and ongoing
disagreements worked out in incremental steps—to “offer[] a more
parsimonious, seemingly more candid, and more authentic
alternative.”31 They posit “a singular common good” that “the people
can discern and will,” and which “a politician . . . can unambiguously
implement” without cumbersome institutional procedures and
debates.32 In this image, the will of the people is whatever the populist
leader intuits and says; deviations are necessarily undemocratic.33
This is refreshingly simple to grasp. It also effectively allows populist
leaders to attribute their own preferences and choices to the people.
Finally, populist leaders invoke a Manichean conflict between a
morally pure, unified people and a corrupt elite or other outsider
group.34 By treating the people they represent as a single, and
singularly righteous, entity, populist leaders “deny the legitimacy of
opposing or alternative perspectives or values.”35 Their claim to
protect the people against an out-of-touch or invidious establishment
goes beyond criticizing existing inequities or representing neglected
constituencies.36 Rather, it denies the very possibility of ongoing
28. Id. at 25–32.
29. Huq, supra note 12, at 1133.
30. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 76–77 (explaining the “attractiveness of
populism” to its followers).
31. Huq, supra note 12, at 1133–34; see also Margaret Canovan, Populism for
Political Theorists?, 9 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 241, 244–45 (2004) (discussing the “Bagehot
Problem”).
32. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 25. Müller explains that “the emphasis on a singular
common good that is clearly comprehensible to common sense and capable of being
articulated as a singularly correct policy that can be collectively willed at least partly
explains why populism is so often associated with the idea of an oversimplification of
policy challenges.” Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 4, 19–25; see also Huq, supra note 12, at 1132–33 (describing this
“moralized antipluralism” as one of the two main elements of Müller’s conception of
populism).
35. Huq, supra note 12, at 1133.
36. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 2 (“It is a necessary but not sufficient condition
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political engagement among groups with different interests or views;
it sees contestants as enemies. In this image, politics is not an ongoing
negotiation over variably distributed interests that are divergent and
convergent by turn; it is a fight to the death between cleanly
delineated, fundamentally opposed forces.
Populists also use the image of Manichean struggle to deflect and
delegitimize criticism.37 In the circular reasoning that typifies this
movement, since the populist leader enacts the people’s will, those
who disagree with her must be that people’s enemies. They can be
shoved into a flexible, expansive category of excluded others who do
not properly count as members of the polity. This group also forms a
reservoir of convenient scapegoats on whom populists can blame the
nation’s problems. Such deflection helps explain “why revelations of
corruption rarely seem to hurt populist leaders,” who are allowed
openly “to hijack the state apparatus,” engage in “mass clientelism,”
and systematically try “to suppress civil society.”38 Claiming to
represent an authentic people’s will against a hostile elite
establishment helps populists achieve the semblance of legitimacy by
fiat.
The rhetoric of populist leaders lends itself most naturally to
outsiders who challenge an establishment to return power to the
people. They therefore typically present themselves as protest
candidates who promise to disrupt prevailing practices and redeem a
tainted status quo.39 Because populists tend to elide the distinction
between campaigning and governance, effectively running “a
permanent electoral campaign,”40 populists can frame themselves as
an opposition movement even when in power.41
to be critical of elites to count as a populist.”).
37. See id. at 38–41 (claiming that populism is distinctive because its leader’s
claim of representation “cannot be disproven”); Huq, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Whereas
on the ordinary understanding of democracy the actions of a specific coalition or
leader are always amenable to critique as misleading or unlawful, it is never possible
to launch a parallel challenge against a populist leader.”).
38. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 4.
39. See Urbinati, supra note 14, at 122–23 (footnote omitted) (recognizing that
“when populists find themselves in the electoral opposition, they see that as itself a
flagrant injustice that requires ‘taking back’ the country from those who have stolen it
from the authentic people,” and explaining that “[i]n claiming that they want to
reinstall the true people in power, populists reveal an ontological and antiprocedural
interpretation of the people and the majority” that privileges “the issue of who rules”
over “the issue of how procedures are operated and used”).
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id.; see also Arato & Cohen, supra note 14, at 288–89 (“The gambit of the
populist leader in power is to retain the mask of the beleaguered outsider constantly
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Because electoral victory legitimizes the leader, populism is
inextricably intertwined with democratic processes even as it
perverts them.42 The idea is that if the populist’s claim to exclusive,
unmediated representation of the people’s will were false, she would
be defeated at the polls.43 That is why populist leaders are frequently
obsessed with the symbolism of even flawed or unrepresentative
elections, and treat electoral victories as full-throated mandates to
implement their programs without interference.44 It is also why
populist leaders who attain power will characteristically do whatever
is necessary to remain in office.45 Populist leaders routinely control or
deconstruct liberal democratic institutions and undermine free and
fair elections, while keeping the outward show of democratic
procedure to legitimize their power.46 All this gives populism a
profoundly destructive potential.47
Meanwhile, by harnessing the trappings of democracy even while
undermining its practices, populist rhetoric often disarms other
political participants.48 The populist’s interlocutors may continue
operating under the normal rules of democratic discourse, which treat
those with opposing views “no[t] as . . . enem[ies] to be destroyed, but
as . . . ‘adversar[ies]’” who have a recognized right to defend their
foiled by the opposition or by the ‘deep state,’ even when (s)he is busily exercising and
expanding executive power, and corrupting or eviscerating counter-powers and
mechanisms meant to keep that power in check.”).
42. See Urbinati, supra note 14, at 115 (recognizing that populism is distinct from
fascism because “electoral legitimacy is a key defining dimension of populist regimes”).
43. At the same time, populists routinely challenge the legitimacy of their
opposition when they run for office and question the integrity of the outcomes when
they lose. See, e.g., MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 26–27, 31–32.
44. Id. at 31; Urbinati, supra note 14, at 119–20.
45. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 56–57 (claiming that populists in power
“tamper[] with the institutional machinery of democracy”); Huq, supra note 12, at 1130
(recognizing that populist leaders make “changes to the electoral framework” to
remain in office); see also David Landau, Personalism and the Trajectories of Populist
Constitutions, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 293, 297 (2020) (noting that populists often
undertake political projects that “tilt the electoral playing field in their favor, making
future elections less fair and making it more difficult to dislodge incumbents from
power”).
46. Landau, supra note 45, at 297.
47. See Urbinati, supra note 14, at 118–24 (providing “a theory of populism in
power”).
48. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523,
523 n.2 (2004) (noting the importance of “the ‘go without saying’ assumptions that
underpin working systems of constitutional government”); see also Joseph Fishkin &
David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 921 (2018)
(“A political maneuver can amount to constitutional hardball when it violates or strains
constitutional conventions for partisan ends.”).
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ideas.49 Rejecting these fundamental assumptions, populists foment
an antagonistic political atmosphere that inhibits the proper
functioning of democratic governance.
Populists’ commitment to the image of a unified people with a
single will allows them to insist on simple correct answers to social
issues that are inherently complex and multifaceted. Their antipluralist, anti-institutional perspective elevates unity, singularity, and
closure over multiplicity, reasoned deliberation, and ongoing
contestation.50 Because constitutional democracies are in fact
characterized by a plurality of interests and perspectives and multiple
institutions with interacting authority, the polity populists conjure
does not actually exist. Populism is, rather, “an ideology based on trust
through faith more than trust through free and open deliberation (and
thus also dissent).”51
Populism should thus be taken seriously, but not literally. It has
been aptly described as “a modern form of political theology.”52
Populist leaders themselves construct the single will of a unified
people through their claims of anti-pluralism, anti-institutionalism,
and Manichean struggle. These devices provide a frame into which
populists can inject the policy contents of their choice. As the
following Part explains, the primary traits of populism find important
resonance in the legal arena. While political populists claim the unique
capacity to represent and embody the will of today’s people, judicial
populism claims special access to the truth of the law and the only valid
methods for reaching it.53 Real democracies, however, rarely
49. Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES.
745, 755 (1999) (“[Democracy] presupposes that the ‘other’ is no[t] seen as an enemy
to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary,’ i.e., somebody with whose ideas we . . . struggle
but whose right to defend those ideas we will not . . . question.”).
50. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 72–73, 76–79 (explaining that populists “break
off the chain of claim-making” that is vital to democracy in favor of a kind of
constitutional closure or finality, and “[t]hey speak and act as if the people could
develop a singular judgment, a singular will, and hence a singular, unambiguous
mandate”); Arato & Cohen, supra note 14, at 287–89 (citing Andrew Arato, Political
Theology and Populism, in THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF POPULISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 31
(Carlos de la Torre ed., 2014)) (explaining that populism “entails a pars pro toto
dynamic through which the authentic part of the population stands for the whole
people; an imaginary of the sovereign people as one, as an ideal unity; a friend/enemy
conception of politics, and an embodiment model of representation”); Urbinati, supra
note 14, at 123 (“The logic of populism is the glorification of one part.”).
51. Urbinati, supra note 14, at 122.
52. Arato & Cohen, supra note 14, at 288. See generally Andrew Arato, Political
Theology and Populism, 80 SOC. RES. 143 passim (2013) (discussing populism as a
political theology).
53. See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
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experience a unified public will. Populist rhetoric, thus, does not
describe a reality. Rather, it constructs a frame that legitimizes a legal
writer’s policy choices while undermining alternative views, all the
while alleviating the responsibility to justify decisions on the merits.
II. SEEING POPULIST TRAITS IN LEGAL WRITING
Scholarship establishing the contours of contemporary
authoritarian populism has focused on the political sphere, especially
on populist leaders and their routes to power through democracy’s
electoral channels. In this Part, we argue that the populist approach is
not limited to chief executives, or even to political actors. Rather, a
populist rhetoric occupies a prominent place in American legal theory.
This judicial populism, which has risen to prominence over the last
several decades, has not yet been recognized as a phenomenon.54 But
with the primary characteristics of contemporary authoritarian
populism in mind, it should be easily recognizable.

2193, 2195 (2017) (“[T]extualists . . . view themselves as faithful agents of the people
rather than of Congress and as faithful to the law rather than to the lawgiver.”).
54. Others have described legal writing as populist as well, sometimes in a
general way. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9
(2009) (referencing an “American populist taste for simple answers to complex
questions.”); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 711–13 (2009)
(recognizing that originalists tend to pit restrained judges “who leave constitutional
decisionmaking in the hands of the people” against “power-hungry elites” that “usurp
our sovereignty”). Others have sometimes described it in ways distinct from our usage.
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Samuel Alito: Populist, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 14, 16,
23–24 (2017) (describing populist writing as “accessible,” as “reflect[ing] an
impatience with formal, or elite, legal rules and, instead, favor[ing] a more instinctive
reaction,” and as drawing on “unlearned but common-sense folk wisdom”); Mila
Versteeg, Can Rights Combat Economic Inequality?, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2017, 2020
(2020) (describing “‘judicial populism’” as “catering justice to the middle class”). There
is also nascent literature emerging on judges’ use of populist rhetoric outside the
United States context. See, e.g., Paul Blokker, Populism as a Constitutional Project, 17
INT’L J. CONST. L. 535 (2019); Alon Harel & Noam Kolt, Populist Rhetoric, False Mirroring,
and the Courts, 18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 746 (2020); Rafael Mafei Rabelo Queiroz, Judicial
Populism in Brazil: Evidence from a Criminal Trial of Political Elites by the Brazilian
Federal Supreme Court (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Diego
Werneck Arguelhes, Judges Speaking for the People: Judicial Populism Beyond Judicial
Decisions, VERFBLOG (May 4, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/judges-speaking-forthe-people-judicial-populism-beyond-judicial-decisions
[https://perma.cc/783G
-PYUL]. The term is multivalent, both over time and over discipline; we do not mean to
insist on some definitive meaning. Our point, rather, is to illuminate the resonance
between certain styles of legal reasoning and a specifically contemporary,
authoritarian politics on the rise across the globe today. We draw our description of
contemporary authoritarian populism’s primary traits from key works in political
theory to help focus our analysis on the phenomenon rather than the word.
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The preceding Part laid out the key attributes of contemporary
political populism: it presents the world in Manichean terms; it claims
to speak for all people with one voice; and it disparages the mediation
of democratic institutions. Populism can be seen as a rhetoric that
propounds an exclusionary universalism, denigrates the legitimacy of
pluralism, and denies the possibility of provisionally reconciling
differing political positions. In this Part, we show how those same key
attributes have found expression in American judicial writing and
legal theory.
To be clear, we do not argue that judicial populist rhetoric caused
political populism or vice versa, and we make no historical claim
about the co-evolution of these rhetorical forms. We think further
research is needed to determine the precise historical route each took
to reach its present position, and how they interacted with one
another along the way.
We claim instead that the political and the legal populist
rhetorical styles resonate with one another through elective affinities
that have not been adequately recognized.55 This resonance,
moreover, has pernicious effects. Judicial populist rhetoric casts doubt
on the legitimacy of basic features of modern democracy, which
involves working out pluralistic policy perspectives through complex
ongoing negotiations in mediating institutions. And it bolsters the
authoritarian populist image of a single leader uniquely embodying
the will of a unified people, making that image seem less absurd and
more legitimate. In our view, judicial and political populism are
mutually enabling.
Democracy, like any political project, depends not only on
institutions and practices but also on an ideational component: a
widespread commitment to its legitimacy. Judicial populist rhetoric
instead denigrates the legitimacy of basic democratic tenets and
structures—pluralism,
institutional
mediation,
multilateral
negotiation. We draw attention to judicial populism not just because
it harmonizes with political populism, but because we believe that it
undermines democracy.

55. “[E]lective affinity is a process through which two cultural forms—religious,
intellectual, political or economical—who have certain analogies, intimate kinships or
meaning affinities, enter in a relationship of reciprocal attraction and influence, mutual
selection, active convergence and mutual reinforcement.” Michael Löwy, Le Concept
d’Affinité Élective chez Max Weber [Max Weber and the Concept of Elective Affinity], 127
ARCHIVES DE SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS 93, 103 (2004).
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A. USING MANICHEAN IMAGERY
Like populism in the political sphere, judicial populist rhetoric
paints a world riven by fundamental, irresolvable conflict between a
pure people and a devious elite. Some versions of the populist style
present this elite as a capitalist or oligarchic class that oppresses an
economically disempowered people.56 The American version tends to
be less perturbed by wealth disparity.57 It focuses instead on
educational credentials, imagining an intellectual elite that oppresses
a simple people through confusion, contempt, and cosmopolitanism;
it also disparages racial minorities and members of other disfavored
groups who are distinct from the “true” people.58 Distinguishing an
intellectual from an economic elite in American public discourse
should ring familiar. Just think of the way scientists who explained the
dangers of COVID-19 quickly became objects of public controversy
while corporate leaders who made record profits from the crisis
avoided it.59 This ability to swap out one disfavored group for another
highlights the way that populism is largely a rhetorical style for
justifying the accrual and use of power, rather than a political program
for achieving particular substantive policy goals.
The Manichean image of society, which demonizes one group and
valorizes another, can be a useful tool for promoting whatever policy
preferences one happens to have. A well-known instance of us-versusthem imagery appeared in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas,
which railed against a cosmopolitan elite out of touch with
56. See generally, e.g., CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 9–24 (2018)
(discussing the “populist moment”).
57. See Urbinati, supra note 14, at 119 (“Central in populism’s narrative is
antiestablishment rhetoric, but this does not refer to socioeconomic elites and is
neither class-based nor money-based.”).
58. See MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 23–24 (noting that right-wing populists in the
United States have historically conceived “of political morality in terms of work and
corruption,” and discerned “a symbiotic relationship between a [liberal intellectual]
elite that does not truly belong and marginal groups that are also distinct from the
people”).
59. Compare Philip Rucker, Laurie McGinley, Josh Dawson & Yasmeen Abutaleb,
Rancor Between Scientists and Trump Allies Threatens Pandemic Response as Cases
Surge, WASH. POST (July 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rancorbetween-scientists-and-trump-allies-threatens-pandemic-response-as-cases
-surge/2020/07/17/d950e9b6-c777-11ea-a99f-3bbdffb1af38_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4H3M-DYYV], with Douglas MacMillan, Jonathan O’Connell, Peter
Whoriskey & Chris Alcantara, America’s Biggest Companies Are Flourishing During the
Pandemic and Putting Thousands of People out of Work, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/50-biggest
-companies-coronavirus-layoffs/ [https://perma.cc/JF2V-G23E].
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mainstream values.60 When the majority held that criminalizing samesex sexual conduct violated the Constitution, the dissent accused it of
“tak[ing] sides in the culture war”—the culture war, note, a
preexisting entity readers are expected to recognize.61 Drawing on
classic populist imagery of an out-of-touch elite opposing the will of
the people, the dissent described the majority as being “[s]o imbued
. . . with the law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is
seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously
‘mainstream.’”62 Decisions about the suppression of marginalized
groups, the dissent goes on, “are to be made by the people, and not
imposed by a governing caste that knows best.”63 There were other
ways to argue for the non-constitutional status of sexual conduct, like
long-standing state power over private conduct and the limits of the
Constitution’s reach. But Justice Scalia chose instead a Manichean
figuring of an innocent people oppressed by an imperious
cosmopolitan elite.
Part of Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus v. AFSCME struck a similar
note.64 Janus invalidated state laws requiring unionized public sector
employees to pay the equivalent of union dues even if they were not
union members themselves.65 Although the dissent praised the
“healthy” and “democratic[] debate” about such “fair-share”
arrangements,66 its concluding sentences strike a darker, more
Manichean note. Justice Kagan wrote that, because it uses the First
Amendment as a route to affect “economic and regulatory policy[,] the
majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers
overriding citizens’ choices.”67 This phrasing echoes that of the
Lawrence dissent, with its vision of a judicial elite oppressing a
powerless people. As this example demonstrates, elements of judicial
populist rhetoric can be present without being pervasive. The rhetoric
is available to anyone, at any moment, to help justify more or less any
legal position.
60. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 602.
62. Id. at 602–03.
63. Id. at 603–04.
64. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2487–502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2486 (majority opinion).
66. “Americans have debated the pros and cons for many decades—in large part,
by deciding whether to use fair-share arrangements.” Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
At the time Janus was heard, there were “22 States . . . on one side, 28 on the other
(ignoring a couple of in-betweeners).” Id.
67. Id. at 2502.
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Choosing a different intellectual elite as his target, Chief Justice
Roberts used a similar Manichean approach to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of Supreme Court regulation of partisan gerrymandering in
Gill v. Whitford.68 In oral argument, he suggested that “the intelligent
man on the street” would not understand the complex calculus that
some experts proposed for determining electoral districting
fairness.69 This man, Justice Roberts feared, would say:
“Well, why did the Democrats win?” And the answer is going to be because
EG was greater than 7 percent, where EG is the sigma of party X wasted votes
minus the sigma of party Y wasted votes over the sigma of party X votes plus
party Y votes. And the intelligent man on the street is going to say that’s a
bunch of baloney. It must be because the Supreme Court preferred the
Democrats over the Republicans.70

This image presents an intellectual elite confusing ordinary people
and casts doubt on the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions utilizing
such expertise.
Justice Roberts had other options for justifying his position.
There was the historical fact that the Supreme Court has refrained
from curbing gerrymandering on any basis other than race.71 There
was the potential difficulty of applying the complex algorithm. Or he
might instead have recalled his own assertion that, for the specialized
field of law, “judges are necessarily engaged in civic education,”72
which could involve explaining to the intelligent man that the Court
figured out how to draw districts to make the election fair. One could
even posit that an intelligent man on a street might realize that his
society has a lot of complexity, rather than treating complexity as a
failing or a ruse. Instead, Justice Roberts chose to use the Manichean
imagery of society as divided between honest, simple folk and the
incomprehensible elites intent on confusing them.73
68. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1922–34 (2018).
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161).
70. Id. at 37–38.
71. See The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 303, 303
(2017) (footnotes omitted) (“Although gerrymandering is often discussed as a partisan
issue, the Court has dealt with it only as a matter of equal protection for racial
minorities, such that racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional, whereas partisan
gerrymandering is not.” (discussing Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017))).
72. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S.
2
(Dec.
31,
2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year
-end/2019year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HYL-9U55] (“By virtue of their
judicial responsibilities, judges are necessarily engaged in civic education.”).
73. Since districting falls within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, Justice
Roberts also predicted that if the Court agreed to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering,
it would “have to decide in every case whether the Democrats win or the Republicans
win.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 36–37. One could, in contrast, treat
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B. DENYING PLURALISM
Populist rhetoric also rejects “the necessary complexity of
representative democracy,”74 subscribing to a “moralized
antipluralism”75 instead of recognizing the diversity of interests and
perspectives that characterizes a large democratic polity. It presents
“the people” as a unified mass with a single will that—conveniently
enough—populists themselves are best suited to embody. Those who
disagree are treated as not just wrong, but fundamentally
illegitimate—the “deep state” or the “fake news.”76 That image also
provides fodder for the Manichean imagery described above, allowing
those who use it to paint themselves as reformist outsiders even when
they occupy positions of power and influence.
In judicial populism, this feature often comes through in
references to a unitary people with a single understanding of a law, to
which the writer has special unmediated access. Litigation is
characterized by adversarial disagreement, but writers employing
judicial populism often assert that their conclusions are not just
correct but indisputable, even obvious. And they imply that the very
possibility of thinking otherwise—the possibility of disagreement
about the law—is illegitimate. In effect, judicial populist rhetoric gives
legal writers tools to assert unassailable legitimacy and universal
accord while in fact merely presenting their own views of what the
law should be.
fair elections, which underlie a polity’s democratic character, as a boon for all
participants in a democracy. On that view, the Court would be asked to decide, not
whether Democrats win or Republicans win, but whether an election is fair—whether,
that is, democracy wins. Justice Roberts instead chose to portray the legal review of
electoral integrity as taking sides in a Manichean conflict between parties happy to
undermine democracy in their hunger for power at any cost. This way of presenting
the situation itself undermines the very notion of democratic process.
74. Huq, supra note 12, at 1134 (quoting Canovan, supra note 31, at 245)
(describing how populism “exploits” the “Bagehot problem” that “modern
representative forms of democracy tend to be predicated on complex institutional
arrangements that seek to account for a plurality of interests and public goods that
might bear on governance,” producing “‘a tangled network that cannot make sense to
most of the people it aims to empower’”).
75. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
76. See Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Chevron Debates and
the Transformation of Constitutional Politics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 619, 688 (2021)
(footnotes omitted) (noting that the Trump Administration’s efforts to deconstruct the
regulatory state involved both economic policy and “a mix of partisan advantage,
ideological faith, and sociological theory. Experts were viewed as not only elite but also
dismissively scornful; statements of science and truth were not just obstacles but
hoaxes and ‘fake news’; government [was] not merely costly but also a treasonous
‘deep state.’”).
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For an example, think of Chisom v. Roemer, in which the Supreme
Court was asked to evaluate a Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)
prohibition on giving one class of “‘citizens . . . less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.’”77 A majority held that the
restriction applied to judicial elections as well as legislative ones, but
Justice Scalia found that clearly wrong: “There is little doubt that the
ordinary meaning of ‘representatives’ does not include judges, see
Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 2114 (1950).”78 It
was so obvious that the opinion did not even bother to quote the
dictionary entry it cited.79
To others, representation has often seemed a rather complex
notion. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation—
already a classic when Chisom was decided—described the term as
having a wide range of meanings: “the giving of authority to act[;] . . .
the holding to account . . . for [such] actions[;] . . . the making present
of something absent by resemblance[,] reflection . . . [or] symbolic . . .
connection[;] . . . [and] acting for others.”80 The ordinary meaning of a
term at the heart of centuries of political theory might be more
complicated than a glance at a Webster’s entry suggests. Indeed, as a
contemporaneous letter to the editor noted, while Webster’s Second
defined “representative” as “one who represents a people or
community in its legislative or governing capacity,” Funk & Wagnall’s
phrased it as a “member of a deliberative or legislative body chosen
by the vote of the people,” a definition that could easily include elected
judges, whose job—one hopes—includes deliberation.81 The dissent,
however, rejected the very possibility of plural opinions on this thorny
subject. “[T]he word ‘representative’ connotes one who . . . acts on
behalf of the people. Judges do that in a sense—but not in the ordinary
sense.”82 The dissent could authoritatively declare this ordinary sense
because—well, it just knew.

77. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 n.2 (1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973)
(current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).
78. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2114 (1950)).
79. Id.
80. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 11–12 (1967).
81. See Theo Lippman, Jr., In an Opinion that Involved the Definition…, BALT. SUN
(June
29,
1991),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-06-29/
news/1991180021_1_dictionary-funk-wagnall-definition
[https://perma.cc/D5BZ
-92BJ].
82. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Alternatively, the dissent argued, “[w]e are to read the words . . .
as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them.”83 From
what we know of Congress, an ordinary Member of Congress would
gain her understanding of a statute from congressional staff
memoranda, committee and conference reports about the statute’s
purposes and likely effects, and follow-up conversations with
staffers.84 She would likely not read the full statute,85 and it is highly
unlikely that she would consider one word in isolation from those
memos and reports explaining the statute.86 And she would certainly
not go to a dictionary.87 While stating that the Court should “read the
words . . . as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read
them,”88 the Chisom dissent betrayed no interest in the actual
practices of Members of Congress,89 nor in showing that any Member
of Congress would actually have read the provision in any particular
way. Instead, the dissent imagined the judge alone as being in the best
position to declare what a Member of Congress would have—should
have—must have—thought.
Using this rhetoric was a choice the dissent did not have to
make.90 Against a background that suggested many ways to use the
83. Id. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. See Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83, 100–
10 (2019) (highlighting survey data that indicates Members of Congress rely mostly
on memoranda and briefings when learning a bill’s contents); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 968
(2013) (“[M]embers [of Congress] are more likely to vote (and staffers are more likely
to advise their members) based on a reading of the legislative history than on a reading
of the statute itself.”); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the
Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 843–47 (2014) (documenting
the increased size and influence of Congressional Committee staff, “the staff most
relevant to [legislative] drafting”).
85. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 84, at 972–73 (quoting survey responses of
congressional staffers) (“Members [of Congress] don’t read [a bill’s] text . . . they all
just read summaries.”).
86. See id. at 970 (“More than [ninety percent] of [surveyed congressional staff]
respondents confirmed . . . that legislative history is used by drafters to explain the
purpose of the statute.”); Shobe, supra note 84, at 815 (“Legislative history
undoubtedly serves a role in Congress’s internal process.”).
87. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 84, at 938 (quoting congressional staffer
respondents) (“[N]o one uses a freaking dictionary.”).
88. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Accord Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979, 986 (2017) (“[T]he nuances of the legislative process are largely irrelevant for the
purpose of [statutory] interpretation.”).
90. As in Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus, other parts of the Chisom opinion used
other rhetorical approaches, such as canvassing statutory history, interrogating the
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term—from differing dictionary definitions to political philosophy to
the fact of this litigation itself—the dissent insisted that there could
only be one way for a reasonable person to legitimately understand
the notion of representation. It is, in other words, not necessarily the
conclusion it reached, but the way it got there, that gives this part of
the Chisom dissent its judicial populist air.
Judicial populist rhetoric often displays a similar self-confidence
about facts in the world, too, rejecting an institutional weighing of
factors or deference to policy makers. In the landmark voting rights
decision Shelby County v. Holder, the Court was asked to invalidate the
VRA’s requirement that states with a history of racial discrimination
in elections preclear changes to electoral practices with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).91 The majority opinion recognized that
“Congress compiled thousands of pages of evidence” about current
election practices “before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act” in
2006.92 The record showed that “between 1982 and 2006, DOJ
objections blocked over 700 voting changes . . . determin[ed to be]
discriminatory”; that 800 more proposed changes were withdrawn or
modified in response to DOJ scrutiny; and that some contemplated
proposals were simply never made based on “informal consultation”
with the DOJ.93 It revealed many attempts to simply reinstate
previously invalidated discriminatory measures, as well as outright
violence and “‘more subtle forms of voting rights deprivations.’”94 At
the same time, the record showed that “the racial gap in voter
registration and turnout” in the covered states had narrowed
dramatically since the VRA’s enactment in 1965; in fact, the national
average racial gap exceeded that of most states covered by the VRA
provisions.95 Despite these gains, Congress voted overwhelmingly to
reauthorize the VRA: 98 to 0 in the Senate, 390 to 33 in the House.96
Indeed, in light of evidence that attempts at voter discrimination had
become more innovative as minority voter registration and turnout

key phrase’s relation to other statutory provisions, and putting the term
“representative” in the context of election law doctrine. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 412–17
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
92. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 571, n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 21,
40–41 (2006)).
94. Id. at 575 (quoting Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 202 (2007)).
95. Id. at 535 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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increased, Congress amended parts of the statute to “prohibit more
conduct than before.”97
The Shelby County majority had a different view: it was “irrational
for Congress to distinguish [among] States in such a fundamental way”
as to require preclearance “when today’s statistics” about voter
registration and turnout “tell an entirely different story” than the one
Congress confronted when it enacted the VRA in 1965.98 The majority
asserted special, better knowledge of the empirical world the
legislation addressed. It could say decisively that increased minority
voter registration and turnout mattered more to voting rights than did
continuing efforts to deter minority voters. There was no room for
multiple legitimate views on the matter.
Shelby County also demonstrates that judicial populist rhetoric,
though replete with invocations of the people, is not a way to actually
give power to the populace. Ignoring a democracy’s inherent
pluralism, it gives legal writers a way to claim universal support for
their conclusions without needing to actually garner support from
anyone in particular. This rhetoric of universal agreement helps
justify the use of legal power without defending, or even
acknowledging, its effects. Shelby County, after all, did empower some
people—the decision made it easier for some people to prevent
citizens from voting. The opinion avoided justifying or even
acknowledging this result, instead using judicial populist tropes to
claim special knowledge—true, indisputable, better than Congress—
about what voting rights really required.99 In this claim, it echoed the
political populist’s assertions of direct access to the clear, unified
needs and desires of “the people”—an image of the people that
inevitably empowers some while excluding others, even while it
claims to encompass all.
C. AVOIDING INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATION
For political populism, the unity of the people’s will and the
leader’s embodiment of it obviates the need for institutional
mediation of plural, divergent interests over time. Conveniently
enough, the populist alone can authoritatively discern and articulate
that understanding; and without mediating institutions, people have
no way of speaking for themselves.

97. Id. at 539 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 556.
99. See id.

2021]

JUDICIAL POPULISM

303

Judicial populist rhetoric follows suit. Shelby County again
provides a useful example. In that case, Congress, a key institution that
mediates plural perspectives in our democracy, had based decisions
on a large factual record. Shelby County rejected the legislature’s
interpretation of the record in favor of its own.100 A large democracy
has a plurality of interests and faces complex realities that require
policy judgment and compromise to address problems in ways that
are unlikely ever to be perfect. In contrast, the language of judicial
populism conjures a unified people which needs no mediating
institutions to make its will clear, and simple factual situations with
obvious answers. That language allows legal writers to make their
conclusions seem correct and even necessary without engaging the
realities of democratic governance. This is, again, not actually a way of
giving power to the populace. On the contrary, as decisions like Shelby
County show, it offers legal writers a way to justify undermining the
very institutions that represent and mediate among divergent policy
preferences—and divergent claims to power.
Denigrating the complex institutions that facilitate democratic
contestation and the ongoing practices that render democratic
governance accountable, the rhetoric of judicial populism tends to
fixate on one clear point of authority—the President—authorized in
one clear point in time—the election. So, for instance, in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, a Supreme
Court majority rejected a conventional administrative accountability
structure,101 in which an employee of an agency is removable only for
good cause by someone who themselves is removable only for
cause.102 Instantiating the accountability network and internal
separation of powers that scholars have identified as a feature of
effective modern democracies,103 this arrangement helps insulate
100. See id. at 557 (stating that Congress’s failure to update the VRA’s coverage
provision in light of improvement in racial voter turnout disparities leaves the Court
“with no choice” but to declare § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional).
101. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 (2010).
102. Justice Breyer’s dissent listed many federal government positions structured
in this way. Id. at 549–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A
New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 861 (2011)
(describing an accountability network as “rules and procedures through which civil
servants are embedded in their liberal democratic societies” by being enmeshed in
complex webs of legal, political, and social relationships with “elected officials,
organized interests, the courts, and the general public,” as well as other
administrators); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2322–43 (2006)
(arguing that increasing the independence of agency personnel through job security

304

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[106:283

positions that require expertise or neutrality from pressure by
interested parties—including the President—without immunizing
them from oversight.104
In contrast, Free Enterprise Fund presents governance as the
unified rule of a unified people: “The Constitution requires that a
President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the
laws.”105 In reality, no president is chosen by the entire nation; some
are even chosen by a minority of voters.106 It is, moreover, not
plausible that any executive decision about the oversight of board
membership will find the kind of intricately coordinated,
geographically distributed response needed to impose a discernible
effect on a presidential election.107 Elections are just one part of
governance in a modern republican democracy. They help establish
the roles in which people participate in government processes, the
and administrative redundancy benefits the legitimacy and the efficacy of the
executive branch); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 425 (2009) (“Internal
checks can be, and often are, reinforced by a variety of external forces—including not
just Congress and the courts, but also state and foreign governments, international
bodies, the media, and civil society organizations.”); Anya Bernstein, Interpenetration
of Powers: Channels and Obstacles for Populist Impulses, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 461, 462–63
(2019) (“By discrediting the ability of the standard intervening institutions of
democracy to legitimately express, enact, or respond to the people’s will . . . the
populist leader positions himself as the only legitimated actor left.”).
104. See 561 U.S. at 532 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress and the President could
reasonably have thought it prudent to insulate the adjudicative Board members from
fear of purely politically based removal.”).
105. Id. at 499; see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1159, 1175–85
(1992) (comparing Article II and III Vesting Clauses to argue that the Constitution
strongly suggests, or even requires, a unitary executive model).
106. See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the U.S.
Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It), 60 BULL. AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCIS. 31, 33 (2007) (“Because of the way the Electoral College operates, we have
regularly, since World War II, sent to the White House presidents who did not have a
majority of the popular vote.”).
107. Voters in the United States have many opinions on many topics, care about
different topics to different degrees, and generally have little accurate knowledge
about the specific policy preferences or positions of presidential candidates. Cynthia
R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload,
and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 378–81 (2010) (discussing studies
showing that voters often lack accurate understandings of presidential candidate
policy positions, and that even well-informed voters often vote for candidates who
share some of their policy preferences but not others). Partly for these reasons,
“[p]olitical scientists have largely abandoned the simplistic account of presidential
elections as national policy referenda that can be legitimately interpreted as issue
mandates.” Id. at 381 n.105.
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interests that will be represented, and so on. But the work of
government lies in ongoing negotiations, collaborations, decisions,
and actions themselves. The rhetoric of judicial populism pictures
elections not as the beginning of the democratic process but as its end:
the point at which the leader is empowered with an exclusive mandate
to speak and act for the people.108
Free Enterprise Fund lodged accountability definitively in the
moment of election, as though that moment created an exclusive,
direct line of accountability between a President and “the entire
Nation” that elected him.109 If the president is not fully empowered to
control the administrative apparatus, Free Enterprise Fund worried,
there is no solution to the “concern that [the Executive Branch] may
slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”110
Such images—equating the leader with the people, naming the leader
as the only one who can fulfill that people’s will, and denigrating
institutions that mediate divergent preferences—typify the rhetoric
of judicial populism.
D. JUSTIFYING POWER IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS EFFECTS
The rhetoric of judicial populism clears a special place for law in
the exercise of power. It presents law as autonomous from politics and
even from social values. This vision of law as somehow divorced from
the social structures and relationships that produce and implement it
implies that legal writers need not, and should not, justify or even
consider the effects of their decisions on the society law regulates.
That implication, in turn, leaves judges free to use judicial populist
rhetoric to justify the use of their power without pressure to justify
that power’s effects.
This image presents law as “static, given, autonomous, [and]
seamless,” as though it could clearly and conclusively settle conflicts
without normative justification or compromise.111 This “legalistic”
view “holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules”112
rather than responsiveness to social conflict and political preference.
Indeed, according to this view, courts are undermined when they
108. In the political sphere, this helps explain why populist leaders tend to engage
in a perpetual campaign against their opponents, even while serving in office. See supra
notes 39–40 and accompanying text (describing the oppositional nature of populism).
109. 561 U.S. at 499.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2003).
112. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (2d ed. 1986).
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consider normative values, because they exercise legitimate authority
only insofar as “their judgments are thought to obey an external will
and not their own,”113 a view expressed in neutral-sounding but
empowering slogans such as “the rule of law as a law of rules”114 or “a
government of laws and not of [people].”115
Legal thinkers following this path present law “as if it were or
should be sharply precise and free of ambiguity.”116 They do so “by
taking words seriously”—that is, by focusing on the law’s words rather
than the consequences or normative implications of legal decisions.117
These views are not exclusive to judicial populist rhetoric, but they fit
it comfortably, giving legal writers a way around the pluralistic values
and institutions that characterize legal as much as political decision
making. This rhetoric allows writers to cast differences of opinion as
illegitimate, and to avoid responsibility for the effects of legal
decisions, as though law were not itself an institution of democracy.
This is one reason that we focus on the tools judicial populism
gives writers for justifying their legal conclusions, rather than on the
conclusions themselves. Populist framing does not impose
consistency on judicial decisions. In the Gill v. Whitford oral argument,
Justice Roberts mobilized populist rhetoric to support the legal status
quo and legislative decisions;118 in the Shelby County v. Holder opinion,
he used a similar rhetoric to invalidate them.119 These paired cases
demonstrate the protean quality of judicial populist rhetoric, which
can be mobilized for a variety of purposes, yet present a veneer of
decisive coherence through its repeated invocations of the people’s
needs, imaginary everymen versus pointy-headed experts, and
politics as a zero-sum contest that precludes common commitments.

113. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 57 (1978) (footnote omitted) (“In interpreting and applying
[autonomous] law, jurists are to be objective spokesmen for historically established
principles, passive dispensers of a received, impersonal justice.”).
114. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989); see also NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 113, at 57–60 (identifying the
separation of law and politics as a defining feature of theories of autonomous law).
115. NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 113, at 53.
116. Id. at 61.
117. Id. (“Close scrutiny of meanings is a hallmark of autonomous law.”).
118. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 37.
119. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013) (characterizing
Congress’s mandate, through the VRA, that certain States obtain federal permission
before enacting any voting-related law as a “dramatic departure from the principle
that all States enjoy equal sovereignty”).
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Judicial populism offers a well of rhetorical tropes and
approaches. Anyone can dip into the well and use aspects of the
judicial populist style, and many legal thinkers deploy it now and
again. In this sense, judicial populist rhetoric is neutral as to policy
ends, equally available to conservatives, liberals, and anyone else who
cares to use it. It provides a way to justify the use of power, rather than
a means for achieving some particular substantive policy end.
At the same time, our impression is that the judicial populist style
has recently been deployed more—though not exclusively—by
writers who subscribe to conservative politics than by those with
liberal ideologies. This asymmetry may have a number of different
causes. The formalist approach to understanding law and government
structure favored by conservative thinkers fits comfortably with the
rhetoric of judicial populism: both prefer clear solutions based on
limited sources, present power as working autonomously, and
express doubt about the legitimacy of disagreement or
multivalence.120 Similarly, much (though not all) conservative writing
of recent years presents adherents as morally righteous and
epistemologically certain,121 while much (though not all) liberal
writing figures proponents as pragmatic, realistic, or reasonably
equivocal.122 Additionally, since populist rhetoric is a means for
justifying the use of power without justifying its effects, it may be
particularly useful for those whose substantive policy preferences are
difficult to justify on the merits or do not garner widespread political
support.123 There may be other reasons we have the impression that
conservative jurists use judicial populist rhetoric more frequently
than liberal ones do. We do not claim to exhaust or evaluate the
possibilities here, nor have we sought to determine empirically the
120. See infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (2019) (emphasizing
the importance of originalist and textualist ideologies when interpreting America’s
founding documents); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (proposing textualism as the proper approach
to legal text interpretation).
122. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005) (finding that the Constitution’s principal role is to encourage
citizen participation); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014) (arguing for
courts to look beyond text when interpreting statutory language).
123. There is some evidence to suggest that important aspects of the conservative
political agenda have not had widespread public support in recent years. See, e.g., Jacob
S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, The GOP Is Trying to Pass a Super-Unpopular Agenda—and
That’s a Bad Sign for Democracy, VOX (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2017/12/7/16745584/republican-agenda-unpopular-polls-tax-reform
[https://perma.cc/5T8K-P33L].
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specific distribution of populist rhetoric across political ideologies.124
Moreover, the adoption of this rhetoric by prominent writers makes it
seem useful, powerful, and even legitimate. As these tropes get
deployed more and more by people in positions of power, we would
expect more writers to take them up. The conservative or liberal use
of judicial populist rhetoric is not relevant to our argument here.125
Whatever ends it is mobilized to serve, the rhetoric of judicial
populism rejects key features of representative democracy. It gives
legal writers ways to avoid justifying the effects of judicial decisions,
and it harnesses extreme and unrealistic images of society and politics
to justify the use of legal power in a way that undermines the
possibility of legitimate criticism or disagreement. Judicial populist
rhetoric itself has anti-democratic implications. Its use, for whatever
purpose, undermines the legitimacy of democratic governance in a
pluralistic society.
III. STANDARD MANIFESTATIONS OF JUDICIAL POPULISM
The rhetorical style described in the preceding Part brings the
populist preference for anti-pluralism, anti-institutionalism, and
Manichean conflict into the legal sphere. This approach provides a
grab bag of tropes any legal writer can draw on, and many use one or
another of them now and then. That is, judicial populism characterizes
arguments more than people: it can come out in offhand remarks and
reveal unarticulated presuppositions. In some cases, though, it can
characterize an entire body of legal theory. In this Part, we canvass
three such areas.
In writing on legal interpretation, textualism and originalism
purport to use uniquely correct methods to implement the true will of
a unified people.126 And in unitary executive theory, legal writers
imagine a regal executive with an electoral mandate to speak and act
on behalf of a unified people, unhampered by plural institutions
designed to leverage expertise and moderate differences.127 In each
area, proponents habitually use Manichean imagery and recast
complex, multifaceted issues as a simple pitting of obvious truth
against bad faith obfuscation. While these moves are clothed in the
language of judicial restraint, they enable proponents to impose their
124. Political scientists have measured the use of populist rhetoric by various
political leaders. See infra note 241 and accompanying text (citing this literature).
125. We do discuss the substantive ends to which judicial populist rhetoric is put
in a companion work in progress.
126. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
127. See infra Part III.C.
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own understandings and preferences onto the law while denying the
possibility that differing views could be legitimate.
A. TEXTUALISM
Political populism generally conjures images of an elected leader
who acts on behalf of ordinary people, implementing something akin
to contemporary popular opinion. It may therefore seem
counterintuitive to characterize originalist methods of legal
interpretation like textualism as manifestations of a deeply analogous
judicial populism. Political populism is also characteristically antipluralist and anti-institutional in nature, while legal interpretation
undeniably focuses on the products of plural democratic institutions.
So how could theories of legal interpretation share the central traits
of political populism?
The key, we think, is to see that judicial populism presents legal
text as the authoritative embodiment of the people’s will, and purports
to provide the only legitimate interpretive methods to do the people’s
bidding. Textualists acknowledge the plural nature of the legislature
when they argue that judges should not disturb the unrecorded
“deals” among lawmakers necessary to secure the law’s enactment
and encoded in the statutory text.128 But they are not interested in the
actual workings of Congress, nor in what elected representatives
sought to achieve or thought would follow when they enacted
legislation. They also routinely suggest that judges who deviate from
the “plain meaning” of legal text to implement Congress’s intent or
promote a statute’s underlying purposes undermine democracy and
the rule of law by imposing their own subjective policy preferences
onto the people.129 While claiming to give voice to underlying
statutory meaning, textualists in effect suggest that “they, and they
alone, represent the people.”130 We contend that their approach is
anti-pluralist, anti-institutional, and Manichean in ways resembling
political populism.
128. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390
(2003).
129. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17–18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(“Under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”).
130. Cf. MÜLLER, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that anti-plural, populist political
candidates present themselves as the sole voice of the people; likewise, textualist
judges purport to provide the sole means of deciphering the law of the people).
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Also like political populists, textualist writers claim a steadfast
consistency while using a theory sufficiently malleable that they can
often do what they want in the name of the people. Indeed, as
explained below, textualism is discretionary all the way down: one
chooses whether to be a textualist, which version of textualism to
follow at any particular time,131 and which “plain meaning” to
attribute to statutory text that is in many cases ambiguous.132 Like
political populism, therefore, the textualist instantiation of judicial
populism is a rhetorical frame rather than a substantive position or an
expression of democratically legitimate judging.
As a prescriptive theory of statutory interpretation,133 textualism
exhorts practitioners to ignore evidence about the circumstances in
which a law was enacted, what its enactors expected to achieve,134 and
how legislatures draft laws or communicate their expected effects.135
Instead, legal practitioners should confine themselves as much as
possible to the words of the statute, whose import should ideally be
clear from their “plain meaning.”136 In the event that the meaning is
not plain, textualists permit adherents to look to several sources for
clarification: ordinary meanings, dictionaries, canons of
interpretation, other statutory provisions, and general legal
background.137 One justification for adhering to these limitations is
legal: only text that has undergone the constitutionally specified
enactment process counts as law, so judges should look only to that
131. Even commentators sympathetic to textualism acknowledge that textualists
are not consistent. See Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 265, 279–81 (2020) (recognizing that textualists’ inconsistency in using the
concept of “context” has generated different versions of their approach).
132. See Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice
Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2019) (“If the cases of 2018 are any indication, the
number of 5-4 splits in cases involving textual method deployed by both sides is a sure
sign that there is no plain meaning to the text, since five members of the Court think it
means one thing and four members think it means something entirely different.”).
133. See Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 635 (2017).
134. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at 349, 369–98 (rejecting use of
legislative history and the concept of legislative intent); Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief
Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. 967, 984–85 (2020) (examining Justice Scalia’s skepticism about
considering legislative purpose).
135. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 86 (2012) (“Textualism imagines
Congress as a failed court, paying no attention whatsoever to congressional procedure
on the theory that it is too chaotic or incoherent.”).
136. See Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435,
484–85 (2018) (discussing the values and limitations underlying the plain meaning
rule).
137. Id. at 467–70 (discussing sources textualism allows).
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text to understand what law means.138 Another is institutional:
enacted legal text crystallizes or embodies the results of negotiations
among many legislators, and judges should not go beyond the text lest
they disturb the “deals” legislators made to enact it or replace
legislators’ choices with their own.139 A third is prudential: restricting
the sources of evidence judges may use constrains their discretion,
producing more rule-bound, predictable, and legitimate decisionmaking.140
Textualism echoes populism’s rhetoric of simplicity.141 But there
is little simple about the law. Producing a federal statute involves
scores of people occupying a myriad of institutional roles and social
138. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 91 (2017) (arguing that drawing evidence of meaning from the
enactment process is “illegitimate” because legislative history is “insufficient to
constitute legislation under our system of governance”); id. at 82 (“Intents are
irrelevant even if discernable . . . because our Constitution provides for the enactment
and approval of texts, not of intents.”).
139. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 128, at 2390; see also John F. Manning, Justice
Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 756 (2017) [hereinafter
Manning, Justice Scalia] (“[I]f a judge elevates a statute’s purpose over its enacted text,
he or she might unknowingly disrupt awkward, behind-the-scenes compromises . . .
essential to the law’s enactment.”).
140. See Scalia, supra note 129, at 22, 40–41; Manning, Justice Scalia, supra note
139, at 750 (explaining that textualism rests upon an “anti-discretion principle”).
141. Our point here is not to refute textualism’s claims but to show how they
manifest a judicial populism in the realm of interpretive theory. Still, it is worth briefly
noting some obvious rejoinders. (1) Legally, the fact that only statutory text is enacted
does not reasonably imply that nothing else may be consulted to help give meaning to
that text, and indeed textualists consult other sources all the time. Dictionaries are not
enacted legal text, yet textualists have no problem using them. (2) Institutionally,
legislatures are complex machines, but they are not free-for-all melees. We know quite
a bit about how legislatures function, and, crucially, how the people writing a statute
communicate its anticipated effects to colleagues who will vote on it. So we can actually
get a pretty good idea of congressional understandings—what those who voted on the
statute thought it would do, whether they liked it or not—that reveal legislative deals
better than a usually sparse statutory text that most legislators never read anyway. See
Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO
Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 209 (2017) (noting that “most congressional insiders and
legislation experts” read the “‘section-by-section’ summary that accompanies most
statutes” to understand what the statute is about and what it is predicted to
accomplish). (3) And to the prudential: just as in other areas of life, there is little reason
to think that limiting information sources constrains interpretation or leads to more
predictable results. See Adam M. Samaha, Looking over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive
Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 558 (2017). Indeed, the
contradictions between textualism’s purported values and its announced method
render it incapable of producing consistent results. See Bernstein, supra note 136, at
473.
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positions and is subject to ongoing commentary and assessment by
individuals and institutions charged with explaining a statute’s
purposes and predicting its effects.142 Statutes, terse yet syntactically
complex and semantically odd, address broad and unpredictable
social problems; they are naturally prone to ambiguity. Once a statute
is enacted, moreover, our legal system works against the possibility
that its meaning will be plain. The agencies that administer most
statutes go through complex, multilateral processes to interpret and
implement them in ways that are subject to change over time. And our
adversarial system encourages would-be litigants to see different
potentials in the same words, fueling arguments about meaning that
lead to periodic judicial elaboration and reinterpretation. Because
each authoritative reinterpretation becomes part of the law, courts
are indelibly involved in the ongoing lawmaking process.
In our view, multiplicity is part of democracy’s strength: a
resilient system provides many people many different kinds of
opportunities to participate in crafting laws whose meanings evolve
over time. For textualists as for political populists, though, multiplicity
appears as a danger or a weakness, or (oddly) both. Faced with
information about legislative production and implementation,
textualists look the other way and decry engagement with the
democratic process; they share political populism’s distaste for the
messy practices of democratic institutions. Working in a legal system
that inscribes judicial pronouncements in the law, textualists
nonetheless insist that participation in lawmaking is an old-fashioned
conceit of “the common law judge[ ]” whose “job [was] really that of
‘playing king—devising, out of the brilliance of one’s own mind, those
laws that ought to govern.’”143 As this phrase suggests, textualists
present lawmaking as unitary and decisive: the law-deviser is
something like a king, and judges are not kings, so judges have no part
in law-devising. Instead of acknowledging their part or justifying their
influence in the multilateral lawmaking process that characterizes the
American litigation system, textualists insist that judges are ethically
142. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 84, at 915 (discussing “the fiction of the
unitary drafter”); Shobe, supra note 84, at 815–51 (detailing the many contributors to
the legislative drafting process); Gluck, supra note 141, at 193–94 (noting
Congressional “staff’s role in statutory-text drafting”); Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as
Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 451, 468 (2017) [hereinafter Shobe, Agencies as Legislators] (describing
“agencies . . . as primary drafters of legislation”); Cross, supra note 84, at 84 (describing
contemporary legislators as managers of a statute-drafting bureaucracy).
143. Manning, Justice Scalia, supra note 139, at 751 (quoting Scalia, supra note 129,
at 7).
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bound to ignore both their place in the system and the power they
wield. Populism’s impatience with complexity and debate resonates
in textualism’s imagination of the judicial role.
Textualist method further echoes populism’s claim to direct,
unmediated communication with the will of an imagined unitary
people. Textualists seek to interpret law without looking to those who
produce, assess, describe, enact, or implement it. They look instead to
“the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social and
linguistic practices would have used the words” the statute
contains.144 Justice Scalia wrote that a statute’s “words mean what
they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written,”145
because, as Judge Easterbrook put it, “the significance of an expression
depends on how the interpretive community alive at the time of the
text’s adoption understood those words.”146 Textualists thus ask
practitioners to ground their interpretation of legal text in audience
understanding.147
Yet they also prohibit adherents from investigating how any
actual people addressed by a statute might understand it. Records of
the statute’s production, which reveal how drafters presented the
statute to colleagues in the enacting Congress—a central audience to
passing a law—are off limits.148 So are discussions with the agency
personnel who are the co-drafters and the addressees of most
statutes.149 And when textualists look at indications of how people
outside the government use language—dictionaries, popular
publications, or even general corpora of language use—they eschew
sources that might illuminate how those people would have
understood the statutory provision at issue, rather than how they
144. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 91 (2006).
145. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at 16; see Lawrence M. Solan, The New
Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2053 (2005) (noting that textualists
eschew pronouncements by those who wrote and voted on a statute, considering
instead what those terms mean to idiomatic speakers).
146. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword in SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at xxv.
147. See Barrett, supra note 53, at 2195 (“Textualists consider themselves bound
to adhere to the most natural meaning of the words at issue because that is the way
their principal—the people—would understand them.”).
148. See Gluck, supra note 141, at 182 (arguing that looking to the Congressional
Budget Office’s evaluation of the economic effects of a bill can illuminate what
members of the enacting Congress understood the law to accomplish); Shobe, supra
note 84, at 815–51 (outlining the legislative drafting process).
149. See Shobe, Agencies as Legislators, supra note 142; Christopher J. Walker,
Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1382–96 (2017) (describing the
many ways administrative agencies participate in drafting legislation).
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might treat some of the same words appearing in an unrelated genre
or context.150 Like political populists, textualists claim a direct line of
contact with the people, an undifferentiated entity that understands
the law in some uniform way which, it turns out, only textualists
themselves are able to discern.151
This view treats a statute as though, once enacted, it took on a life
removed from any practical grounding in the world it governs, with
only the textualist judge able to voice its authentic reality. This
transcendental certainty may help explain how textualists can
propound several different interpretive approaches while
maintaining that each one is superior to all others. Should statutory
terms mean what they “conveyed to reasonable people” outside the
legislature?152 Or should we interpret them “as any ordinary Member
of Congress would have read them”?153 Justice Scalia has told us to
take each of these—different—approaches and to renounce all others.
Faced with a very old legal term like “equity” in a statute from a more
recent time like 1974, should we give equity the meaning it had in
1974, “at the time of the text’s adoption,” as Judge Easterbrook
describes Justice Scalia’s approach?154 Or should we hark back to give
equity the meaning it had in the “days of the divided bench,” as Justice
Scalia did when addressing this question?155 Each of these—
contrary—methods is presented as showing the one true way.
Again, we are not concerned here with the particular results
textualists reach in any given case, but with the path they take to get
there. Textualism insists that judges should not consider the
normative or practical implications of their decisions; they should just
follow the one true method to reach the correct answer. But this
method turns out to be inconsistent, even somewhat chaotic.156 That
makes it easier for judges to reach whatever results they want, while

150. Bernstein, supra note 136, at 469–70; Anya Bernstein, Legal Corpus
Linguistics and the Half-Empirical Attitude, 160 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 15–17) (on file with authors) (explaining that even when textualists
turn to social scientific methods of evaluating how people use language, they avoid
evidence that might reveal how statutory terms work in their real-world contexts).
151. Bernstein, supra note 136, at 466–76.
152. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at 16.
153. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Easterbrook, supra note 146, at xxv.
155. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210–12 (2002).
156. See Grove, supra note 131, at 279–90 (recognizing competing strands of
textualism).
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still righteously ignoring their normative and practical
implications.157
Just last Term, a single case yielded three divergent textualist
opinions. Bostock v. Clayton County asked whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discriminating against an
employee “because of such individual’s . . . sex,”158 proscribed
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender
status.159 According to Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, “[t]he
answer is clear.”160 An employer who fired a male employee for being
in a romantic relationship with a man would not fire a woman for
being in a romantic relationship with a man, so sex would be a but-for
cause of the firing.161 Justice Alito found this equation of sex with
sexual orientation “preposterous,”162 because an employer could
reject an employee with homosexual leanings without even knowing
their sex.163 Anyway, textualism “calls for an examination of the social
context in which a statute was enacted,” and “[i]n 1964, ordinary
Americans . . . would not have dreamed that discrimination because of
sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less
gender identity.”164 Justice Kavanaugh, too, thought the “[t]he answer
[was] plain[].”165 A textualist “must adhere to the ordinary meaning of
phrases, not just the meaning of the words in a phrase,”166 which one
157. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory
Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053,
2071–72 (2017) (recognizing the active and value laden nature of textualism); Gluck
& Bressman, supra note 84, at 962–64 (arguing that textualism’s active nature should
be acknowledged despite its claims to objectivity and neutrality).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
159. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
160. Id. at 1737.
161. Id. at 1741 (“[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being
homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on
sex.”); see id. at 1735 (“[T]o discriminate on . . . grounds [of sexual orientation or
gender identity] requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees
differently because of their sex.”).
162. Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1763 (arguing that an employer’s discrimination against an employee
with a same-sex partner is not based on the employee’s sex but on their “attraction to
members of their own sex—in a word, sexual orientation”); id. at 1760 (denying that
“an employer cannot reject an applicant based on homosexuality without knowing the
applicant’s sex”).
164. Id. at 1767. But see James A. Macleod, Finding Original Public Meaning 29–32
(2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (presenting experimental data
indicating the opposite).
165. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1825.
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gathers from a larger legal context, and that “reflects and reinforces
the widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination
is distinct from . . . sex discrimination.”167
None of the Bostock opinions considers the normative value of
anti-discrimination; or the way that discrimination against gays and
lesbians supports patriarchy;168 or even the fact that “the legislative
debate over Title VII” presented sex discrimination “as a means of
enforcing conventional sex and family roles.”169 Rather, each opinion
presents its own—distinctive—textualist method as the only
legitimate option.170 This pretty fairly characterizes textualist
analysis.171
Textualism presents the consideration of values, norms, or effects
as illegitimate, and insists that only its method can yield the right
results.172 But this supposedly stringent and constraining method
leaves so much wiggle room that there are plenty of results to choose
from.173 In textualism’s peculiar argumentation style, moreover, the
premise tends to be the same as the thesis: since enacted text is all
there is to understanding law, it follows that all we need to understand
law is the enacted text. This circular logic, reminiscent of religious
exegesis, gives textualist assertions an inevitable, irrefutable
sound.174 But it leaves out the fundamentally social, normative, and
efficacious nature of law; not to mention the wild inconsistencies of
textualist analysis itself. Textualism, in other words, claims
legitimation by fiat in a way that resembles political populism.
167. Id. at 1830.
168. Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J.F. 115, 121–26
(2017) (reviewing decades of scholarship connecting discrimination against gays and
lesbians to gender subordination).
169. Id. at 125 (quoting Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1328 (2012)).
170. Cf. MILTON ROKEACH, THE THREE CHRISTS OF YPSILANTI (1964) (describing an
experiment in which three people who each believed himself to be Jesus Christ were
housed together in the same institution).
171. See Grove, supra note 131, at 279–85 (using Bostock to illustrate textualism’s
inconsistencies); Macleod, supra note 164 (same).
172. See Bernstein, supra note 136, at 467–473.
173. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) (explaining that textualism involves an “active, creative
approach” to decision-making that “transform[s] statutory interpretation into a kind
of exercise in judicial ingenuity” where interpretive problems are treated “like a puzzle
to which it is assumed there is one right answer”).
174. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1309–20 (1990) (rooting Justice Scalia’s approach to legal interpretation in
his religious training).
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Textualism’s circular logic holds strong even when its premises
collide. John Manning writes of Justice Scalia’s devotion to “the idea of
judicial restraint”175 as “an independent reason to adhere to . . . textual
conclusions,” one that “did not necessarily derive from . . . a particular
governing text.”176 On Manning’s telling, then, textualism’s tenets rest
on a principle that itself is not grounded in legal text. Yet textualism’s
central tenet is to reject principles not grounded in legal text.
Textualist teachings thus appear to delegitimize textualism itself. But
through the magic of legitimation by fiat, textualists can return to the
premise that the text is all that matters and conclude that all that
matters is the text. Just as political populism claims special access to
the will of the people, judicial populism claims special access to the
truth of the law.
To be clear, attention to text is not a sign of populist thinking. Nor,
of course, are textualists the only readers to treat text seriously. Take
last Term’s Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania.177 Federal
agencies exempted organizations that claim religious scruples from
the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) requirement that health insurance
plans provide free contraception.178 The statute provides that, “with
respect to women . . . a health insurance issuer . . . shall . . . provide . . .
such additional preventive care . . . as provided for in . . . guidelines
supported by [the Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA)].”179 HRSA guidelines include contraception.180 While the
majority accepted the exemption, Justice Ginsburg argued that the
statute did not give agencies the latitude to create exceptions to this
mandate: the ACA says that anyone who is “a health insurance issuer
. . . shall . . . provide [the] coverage” at issue, not that only some health
insurance issuers should.181 Justice Ginsburg noted archly, “I begin
with the statute’s text. But see ante, at 17 (opinion of the Court)
(overlooking my starting place).”182 And while she thought the text

175. Manning, Justice Scalia, supra note 139, at 750 (explaining that Justice Scalia’s
commitment to judicial restraint provided a “central grounding for all of [his]
commitments”).
176. Id. at 755; see also id. at 750 (“Justice Scalia’s anti-discretion principle . . . does
not focus . . . upon any . . . account of Article III’s original understanding.”).
177. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367 (2020).
178. Id. at 2373.
179. Id. at 2379–80 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
180. Id. at 2374.
181. Id. at 2404 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
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rather clearly did not allow exemptions,183 she did not deny the
possibility of legitimate disagreement, or insist that one true answer
was obvious, or ignore the role of legislatures in crafting statutes.
Textualism, in other words, is not a shorthand for paying attention to
text. It is a rhetorical frame to help legitimize legal claims, and it
habitually draws on the same tropes as political populism.
B. ORIGINALISM
Originalism in constitutional interpretation, like textualism,
exhibits the key traits of political populism by suggesting that the
Constitution’s text embodies the founding generation’s will, and that
courts can only legitimately speak on the people’s behalf by using
originalist interpretive methods. Originalism holds that judges
interpreting the Constitution should impute to it the meanings its
provisions had at the time they were enacted.184 On this view, original
meanings are not merely relevant to interpretation, they are
dispositive.185 Originalism started as an intentionalist approach that
asked what the Constitution’s writers meant by their words,186 but
soon moved in an audience-oriented direction, basing interpretation
on the way a constitutional provision’s original public would have
understood it.187 This “original public meaning originalism” had
183. Id.
184. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 378 (2013) (“The two crucial components of originalism are the claims that
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the textual adoption and that the
discoverable historical meaning of the constitutional text has legal significance and is
authoritative in most circumstances.”); Berman, supra note 54, at 5 (“[O]riginalism
maintains that courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions solely in accordance
with some feature of those provisions’ original character. . . . [although t]he feature of
the original character that is said to demand this strong judicial solicitude varies across
originalist theories.”). The literature on originalism is vast. Our goal here is not to
encompass all this work but to illuminate some key traits that connect originalist
approaches to populism.
185. See Berman, supra note 54, at 2; Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989) (“Originalists are committed
to the view that original intent is not only relevant but authoritative . . . .”).
186. See Farber, supra note 185, at 1086 (noting that originalists believe “that we
are . . . obligated to follow the intent of the framers” and that “clear evidence of original
intent is controlling on any ‘open’ question of constitutional law”).
187. Whittington, supra note 184, at 378 (“The terms of the debate have shifted
somewhat over time, from talking about ‘original intent’ to talking about ‘original
meaning.’”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 923, 926 (2009) (defining “original public meaning originalism” as “the view
that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the conventional semantic
meaning that the words and phrases had at the time the provision was framed and
ratified”).
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difficulty dealing with precedent, which American law generally views
as authoritative even if it does not conform to an originalist’s
understanding of a provision’s original public meaning.188 A more
“inclusive” latter-day version of the theory has emerged to embrace
post-founding-era changes insofar as founding-era law would have
authorized such developments.189 This “original law originalism”
allows originalists to vaunt the original audience understanding of a
constitutional provision while accepting contrary precedent, on the
theory that the Constitution’s original audiences recognized
precedent as binding.190
Originalists tend to stay vague about what justifies choosing
some original audiences over others as guides. After all, each
constitutional provision governed many kinds of people on its
enactment. The structure of the federal government was significantly
influenced by the existence of slavery, for instance, and limits on
women’s autonomy formed part of the legal background to the
Constitution.191 Yet originalists generally do not attempt to uncover
how enslaved people or women—or really anyone beyond those few
who wrote, defended, and voted on it—understood constitutional
text.192 Originalists thus tend to seek guidance about general public
188. Whittington, supra note 184, at 400–02 (noting that “how much respect
judges should pay to judicial precedents that are apparently inconsistent with the
original meaning of the Constitution” is an important “unsettled . . . question . . . within
the originalist literature” and that the “theory . . . does not definitively instruct judges
on what they should do if they find themselves confronted with a legal and political
status quo that already departs substantially from the original meaning of the
constitutional text”).
189. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2354–59
(2015) (arguing for an “inclusive originalism” that treats original meaning as the
“ultimate criterion for constitutional law, including the validity of other methods of
interpretation or decision,” which can be legitimate “to the extent that the original
meaning incorporates or permits them”; this legitimizes precedent because the
Constitution itself was “originally read . . . in the context of the common law,” which
applies precedent).
190. Id. at 2361 (“Because originalism permits a doctrine of precedent, many of its
most obvious conflicts with modern practice go away.”); William Baude & Stephen E.
Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2019).
191. See, e.g., JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR
ABOLISHING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 67–79 (2020) (detailing how electoral
apportioning and the electoral college grew out of the conflict between slave states and
free states); Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79 (2020) (showing that legal
rules and precedents about slavery continue to permeate current American law);
Michael Boucai, Before Loving: The Lost Origins of the Right to Marry, 2020 UTAH L. REV.
69 (discussing the evolution of family law and the legal role of women in marriage).
192. See James W. Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique,
67 ALA. L. REV. 675, 688–89 (2016) (recognizing that “the current originalist definition
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meaning from writers with clear interests in having the Constitution
understood in ways that would support particular results.193 The
theory insists that audience understanding must guide constitutional
interpretation, but generally ignores most people in the Constitution’s
audience. In other words, originalism takes the anti-pluralist view that
the public is an undifferentiated mass with a single shared
understanding, an exclusionary universalism that obviates the need to
consider alternative views. And with anti-institutionalist conviction,
originalists present themselves as the only ones competent to speak
for these original people.
These tendencies were on display in District of Columbia v. Heller,
a major originalist opinion, in which the Supreme Court considered
whether the Second Amendment precluded a regime prohibiting
unlocked guns in the home.194 As readers probably remember, the
Second Amendment states, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms shall not be infringed.”195 One of Heller’s main questions was
whether the Second Amendment secured an individual right to
possess firearms, or whether any right it protected was instead tied to
a military purpose.196 In evaluating the meanings of the phrase “bear
arms,” the dissent noted an unenacted proposal by James Madison to
provide that “no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall
be compelled to render military service in person.”197 The way this
clause linked “bearing arms” to “military service,” the dissent argued,
implied that bearing arms was something typically done in a military
context.198
of public meaning itself excludes subordinated communities,” and that “originalism’s
need for a single, determinate meaning renders it closed to the multiple meanings that
we actually find historically”).
193. The majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, for instance, expressed
doubt about looking to Antifederalist texts for clues about the original public meaning
of the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008). Yet if one seeks original public
meaning, rather than one group’s meaning or drafters’ intents, then surely
Antifederalists as well as Federalists—along with lots of people who did not identify
strongly with either side—should count. Unless, that is, original public meaning
actually means original meaning expressed by the public that won the vote.
194. 554 U.S. at 573; see Solum, supra note 187, at 926 (“In [Heller], the Court
embraced originalism.”).
195. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
196. 554 U.S. at 582–95.
197. Id. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169 (1997)).
198. Id. at 660–61 (quoting House debates expressing fears that the federal
government would disarm “the States’ militias” by unilaterally identifying those with
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The majority knew better. The conscientious objector clause
“was not meant to exempt from military service those who objected
to going to war but had no scruples about personal gunfights.”199 The
majority found the clause’s purpose obvious because
contemporaneous Quakers objected both to military service and to
personal gunfights.200 Quaker tenets regarding battles and
gunfights—though not Quaker tenets regarding hunting rabbits for
dinner—thus held the key to what “bearing arms” meant to the
Constitution’s original public.201 Madison’s conscientious objector
clause mentioned neither gunfights nor rabbits. But it did mention
bearing arms and military service. So one might think that Madison
was not concerned with all the uses to which a firearm might be put,
but with one particular use—military—that he indicated with the
phrase “bear arms.” The Heller majority did not waste time weighing
the different implications that different kinds of evidence might
suggest. It just knew what the clause was really for. It claimed
privileged access to this historically distant iteration of the people.
With a sharply split Court, many amici on both sides, significant
academic debate, a long history of local regulations, and existing
precedent linking the amendment to military use,202 the legal
interpretation in Heller was, to put it mildly, contested. Yet, speaking
for only a bare majority of the Court, the majority opinion called the
reasoning of those who disagreed with it “[g]rotesque.”203 Addressing
evidence that in the eighteenth century “bear arms” normally
indicated a military context, the opinion took a phrase from the
Declaration of Independence and a page from the Oxford English
Dictionary and declared it “unequivocal[]” that the words indicated
military use only “when followed by the preposition ‘against.’”204 The
religious scruples and prohibiting them from bearing arms).
199. Id. at 590 (majority opinion).
200. Id. (citing studies of Quakers).
201. See Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 21, 1995),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/09/21/to-keep-and-bear-arms
[https://perma.cc/9DC5-8PNA?type=image] (“One does not bear arms against a
rabbit.”).
202. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also Moyer v. Secretary
of the Treasury, 830 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“It has long been established
that the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation of the
use or possession of firearms.”).
203. Heller, 554 U.S. at 587. The majority held the right to be individual, with no
relation to a militia. Id. at 635.
204. Id. at 586. Contra Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E.
Baron, Ph.D., Richard W. Bailey, Ph.D. and Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Ph.D. in Support of
Petitioners at 18–19, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (listing contemporaneous uses
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dissent posited that although “bear arms” could be qualified to
encompass many situations, unmarked by a modifier the phrase
normally implied a military context.205 The idea that words can imply
a prototypical situation but encompass other situations when
modified is a staple of research in linguistics;206 the majority called it
“worthy of the Mad Hatter.”207 Dismissing the very possibility of
reasonable disagreement or uncertainty typifies political populism,
and it finds clear parallels in originalism.
Originalist theory has recently also claimed privileged access to
hidden—yet binding—commitments that courts have made ever
since the founding. Inclusive original law originalism sees original
public meaning as the true test of constitutional text, but accepts nonoriginal understandings if rendered by approaches that were
themselves legally valid at the founding.208 Surveying Supreme Court
decisions, proponents find that constitutional interpretations always
refer to original meanings or intents. Even when the Court reaches
conclusions that stray from what an original audience would have
thought (think Brown v. Board of Education), it still justifies them by
reference to original meaning, intent, understanding, or principle.209
Or it rests on precedent, whose power is itself based on founding-era
legal principles.210 This means that “[o]ur law today incorporates our

of “bear arms” without “against” to indicate military service, including an entry from
the Oxford English Dictionary).
205. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.
206. See, e.g., EDWIN L. BATTISTELLA, MARKEDNESS: THE EVALUATIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE
OF LANGUAGE ix (1990) (“The principle of markedness is a central part of structural
theories of language . . . .”); Charles J. Fillmore & Collin Baker, A Frames Approach to
Semantic Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 313 (Bernd Heine &
Heiko Narrog, eds. 2009); Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis:
Is There a Linguist in the Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069, 1073 (1995) (discussing
prototypicality in language and collecting sources).
207. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.
208. Baude, supra note 189, at 2363 (“This form of inclusive originalism simply
requires all other modalities to trace their pedigree to the original meaning.”). The
theory is thus “inclusive” in the sense that it accepts things beyond original
understandings, and in particular precedent, but it sticks to original law by insisting
courts use only interpretive methods endorsed by the original audience. Id. at 2358–
61.
209. Id. at 2380–81.
210. Id. It is not clear why original law originalism would include precedent but
preclude other traditional modalities of constitutional interpretation like purposive,
ethical, or prudential considerations, or, indeed, practical reasoning in general. See
generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991) (describing
the conventionally accepted modalities of constitutional interpretation).
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original law by reference.”211 And not only is that original law relevant,
it is dispositive: “originalism is the official story of our legal system.”212
All cultures have “official stor[ies].” Some call such a story
ideology, because it expresses commitments and worldviews that help
people explain, justify, and interrogate their surroundings.213 Others
call it a trope, because it helps people make even new ideas feel
recognizable by conforming to audience expectations.214 Inclusive
original law originalists call this story our law and maintain that it
binds us: past references to historical understandings obligate courts
to base interpretations on framing-era thought.215 This newer form of
originalism thus claims special access not just to what people thought
and wanted in the framing era, but to the law they subsequently
imposed on themselves so secretly that even they did not realize it.
Disagreement, meanwhile, can be dismissed as just a failure to
recognize the true law that binds us all.
To proponents, this view has some distinctive payoffs. It
alleviates the need to provide strong “conceptual []or normative
justifications” for originalism, or to “show that originalism is the firstbest legal arrangement as a normative matter.”216 If originalism is
already the law, there is, purportedly, no need to justify it: the law is
the law and that is all there is to it. Instead of messy deliberation and
211. Baude & Sachs, supra note 190, at 1457.
212. Id. at 1468.
213. See, e.g., Michael Silverstein, The Uses and Utility of Ideology: Some Reflections,
2 PRAGMATICS 311, 313 (1992) (“[I]deology is characteristic of any sociocultural
phenomenon . . . [and] must inhere in what makes any social entity . . . cohere as that
social entity. . . . [T]here is no such thing as a social fact without its ideological aspect
. . . .”).
214. Eric J. Segall, Originalism off the Ground: A Response to Professors Baude and
Sachs, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 313, 313 (2019) (“Far from being our law, originalism is
used by judges mainly as a rhetorical device to justify decisions reached on other
grounds.”); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501,
506 (1948) (distinguishing between “the mechanism” of legal reasoning and its
“pretense,” and explaining that constitutional interpretation gives the Court the
flexibility to conceal its task “either as a search for the intention of the framers or as a
proper understanding of a living instrument, and sometimes as both”).
215. Baude & Sachs, supra note 190, at 1458 (referring to “the binding force of our
original law”); Baude, supra note 189, at 2397 (“Originalism obligates judges to a
particular method of reasoning, both by placing the original meaning at the top of the
pyramid of authority and by providing a test for which other methods may be used in
the lower steps.”). Other scholars have found that federal courts have a consistent
practice of not treating interpretive approaches as precedential. See Evan J. Criddle &
Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573 (2014); infra
notes 341–45 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s interpretive pluralism).
216. Baude, supra note 189, at 2352.
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debate about what our laws should be or what legal methods we ought
to use, this originalism offers a “method of resolving conflicts among
. . . modalities”217 with a value-free syllogism that brooks no dispute:
“originalism is the law” and “government officials should obey the
law.”218 This tie-breaker avoids the—apparently distressing—
possibility that our legal discourse “lacks any coherent
‘truthmaker.’”219 That is, in place of the institutions that democracies
create for ongoing negotiation over conflicts and uncertainties,
originalists seek a single truthmaker who can settle things once and
for all. They locate that truthmaker in their story of the people, unified
across society and through history. Originalists thus echo populism’s
anti-institutional bent to solve the problem of pluralism and obviate
the need to justify our law.
C. EXECUTIVISM
Judicial populism places tremendous stock in the political
accountability imposed by elections, and thus tends to view
presidential elections as tantamount to a national mandate.220 This
view echoes the “unitary executive theory” that holds that the
Constitution creates “a hierarchical, unified executive department
under the direct control of the President,” who “alone possesses all of
the executive power and . . . therefore can direct, control, and
supervise” all other actors in the administrative state.221 Unitary
executive theory is not a theory of legal interpretation, but its
substantive interpretation of the Constitution is informed by the same
ideological commitments and rhetorical tropes as populism—namely,
that there is a unified people with an identifiable political will that can
be embodied in one elected political leader.
The image of a unified national executive marching lockstep
under the control of one leader mirrors a corollary image of a unified
people asking that leader to represent them. The president is “the only
official who is accountable to a national voting electorate and no one
else.”222 While other elected officials are subject to subnational
217. Baude & Sachs, supra note 190, at 1489 (quoting Christopher R. Green,
Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 497, 514–16
(2018)).
218. Baude, supra note 189, at 2352.
219. Baude & Sachs, supra note 190, at 1489 (quoting Green, supra note 217, at
514–16).
220. See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text.
221. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 105, at 1165; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (1994).
222. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
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political pressures, the “true claimant to the executive throne”
represents and cares about the people as a whole, not some subset of
them:223 he is “the conscious agent[] of . . . a national majority
coalition.”224 Moreover, we can rest assured that the president will act
for the public good: “If that coalition will, by its very nature, be likely
to be moderate, temperate, and just, so too will its agent be likely to
be moderate, temperate, and just.”225
Unitary executive theory echoes political populism’s moralized
anti-pluralism in pitting the single national voice of the president
against parochial voices in Congress and other governmental
institutions.226 We can depend on a unitary executive “to protect the
polity as a whole from factional strife,”227 whereas a plural
administration would “split the community into the most violent and
irreconcilable factions.”228 The president alone can therefore unify the
public and serve as “a guarantee of public interestedness” against the
narrow, rent-seeking behavior of critics and opponents.229
Unitary executive theory also adopts political populism’s
noninstitutionalized notion of the people, claiming that the president,
“and he alone, speaks for the entire American people.”230 Instead of
viewing Congress, the courts, and regulatory agencies as legitimate
forums that weigh the president’s preferences or priorities against
alternative perspectives and neutral expertise to provide desirable
checks and balances, judicial populism portrays legislative oversight,
judicial review, and administrative discretion as threats to the leader’s
energy and accountability.231 Unitary executive theory also takes a
Manichean stance against public officials who seek to conduct
oversight or contradict the president’s political agenda, portraying the
president’s critics or opponents as nefarious members of a deep state

48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 59 (1995).
223. Id. at 62.
224. Id. at 67.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 38, 67.
227. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
228. See id. at 41 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 474
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
229. Id. at 42.
230. Id. at 36.
231. See JOHN P. BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THEORIES AND DILEMMAS 87–90 (2016)
(“Perhaps the theory’s greatest flaw is that it is difficult to square such a strong, unitary
conception of executive control with Madison’s theory of shared powers and checks
and balances on each branch.”).
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or enemies of the people who are engaged in illegitimate or bad faith
obstructionism or “witch-hunt[s].”232
Unitary executive theorists contend that the Constitution gives
the president untrammeled authority to control his subordinates by
removing them from office at will, affirmatively directing their actions,
or even acting in their stead.233 And proponents characteristically
interpret the Constitution to promote these prerogatives and protect
the president from what they view as intrusive meddling by
Congressional oversight committees, government watchdogs, or the
federal judiciary.234 In corresponding court decisions, judges purport
to remain above the fray of politics while effectively immunizing the
president’s actions from meaningful scrutiny.235 Because elections
provide all the accountability necessary, if the people object to the
president’s conduct, they will simply elect someone else.236
Like political populism, unitary executive theory suggests that
the president can embody the interests of a unified people and ensure
that the executive branch acts consistent with their will, meaning that
strong presidential power puts the people in charge.237 This could not
possibly be true in a large and diverse nation; indeed, for reasons
explored in Part II, the president cannot even reliably be said to
represent the interests or views of a majority of Americans.238
Moreover, the president cannot personally oversee or manage any
more than a handful of the countless decisions of a vast regulatory
232. See, e.g., David Smith, Alternative Facts, Witch-Hunt, Bigly: The Trump Era in
32
Words
and
Phrases,
GUARDIAN
(U.K.)
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/28/alternative-facts-bigly
-witch-hunt-trump-era-words-phrases [https://perma.cc/3LLG-CADV].
233. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 222, at 58.
234. See BURKE, supra note 231, at 87–90 (quoting Louis Fisher, Invoking Inherent
Powers, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 1, 10 (2007)) (“[Unitary executive theory] places all
executive power directly under the control of the president, leaving no room for
independent commissions, independent counsels, congressional involvement in
administrative details, or statutory limitations on the president’s power to remove
executive officials.”).
235. See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(holding the House Judiciary Committee’s lawsuit to enforce a subpoena for testimony
from the White House Counsel nonjusticiable), rev’d in part en banc, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 7, 2020); In re Flynn, 961 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (granting a petition for
writ of mandamus to foreclose the district court from conducting a hearing to consider
the government’s motion to dismiss criminal charges against a confederate of the
president), rev’d in part en banc, 973 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 2020).
236. Calabresi, supra note 222, at 45.
237. See Farina, supra note 107, at 373–95 (discussing unitary executive theory’s
impossible democratic promises).
238. See supra Part II and accompanying text.
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state.239 Unitary executive theory thus propounds “false comfort and
impossible promises,” including “the simultaneous insistence that the
President is entitled to virtually complete autonomy and is uniquely
motivated to govern in the national interest.”240
Unitary executive theory neatly expresses the basic tenets of
populism. It denigrates the complexities and trade-offs of
representative government and modern administration. It imagines
instead a direct bond between a single leader and his single people.
And it fantasizes that both leader and people will be righteous and fair
without the inconvenience of debate or negotiation. Like textualism
and originalism, unitary executive theory manifests a frame for
judicial populist claims. We turn now to how that frame is constructed.
IV. BUILDING JUDICIAL POPULISM’S RHETORICAL FRAME
Certain rhetorical styles and tropes characterize political
populism.241 Indeed, to some extent, rhetoric defines populism,
allowing a recognizably similar style to support different substantive
policies or outcomes.242 Judicial populism, too, employs a familiar
store of rhetorical practices closely related to those of political
populism but also tailored for the legal sphere. Focused on law and
legal decision-making, it draws on recognizable forms of legal
reasoning and known traditions in legal thought to help construct
populist imagery and arguments. Using familiar conventions in a new
way, judicial populist discourse constructs a peculiar frame within
which to view objects like law, judging, and democracy, but treats the
frame it has created as an attribute of the legal object itself. That is,
writers in this vein use the populist frame to imply and insist that law,
239. See Farina, supra note 107, at 396–412.
240. Id. at 377.
241. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Measuring Populism Worldwide, 26 PARTY POL. 697,
698–700 (2020) (“In this research project populism is conceived at minimum as a form
of rhetoric, a persuasive language, making symbolic claims about the source of
legitimate authority and where power should rightfully lie. The discourse rests on twin
claims, namely that (i) the only legitimate authority flows directly from the ‘will of the
people’ (‘the citizens of our country’), and by contrast (ii) the enemy of the people are
the ‘establishment.’ The latter are depicted as the powerful who are corrupt, out of
touch, self-serving, falsely betraying the public trust, and seeking to thwart the popular
will.”); Kirk A. Hawkins, Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in
Comparative Perspective, 42 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1040, 1042–46 (2009) (defining
populism “as a Manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the
people and Evil with a conspiring elite,” and involves “a series of common, rough
elements of linguistic form and content that distinguish populism from other political
discourses”).
242. Norris, supra note 241, at 698–701.
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judging, and democracy simply are what they say. This Part explores
how this frame is constructed.
The judicial populist frame centers on the claim that the law
embodies the unified people’s single will, which a judge can discern by
using the appropriate method of interpretation or reasoning. This
claim implies that normative argument is unnecessary or even
illegitimate: the decisive question is whether a judge uses the correct
method, which will lead to a preexisting, uniquely correct result. The
(counterfactual) presupposition here is that legal interpretation can
have one correct result, rather than being embedded in an ongoing
multilateral process of development. In judicial populist imagery, the
normative issues have already been settled. All that remains for a good
judge to do is to use the correct method to discern the people’s will
embodied in the law.
If using the right method produces the right answers, moreover,
it stands to reason that considering the normative implications or
practical consequences of legal decisions merely diverts us from the
truth. Those who do so can thus easily be accused of substituting the
judge’s will for the will of the people, legibly embodied in the law.
Judicial populist rhetoric therefore prizes minimalism, arguing that
judges should affect both law and policy as little as possible. If law is
the crystallization of the people’s will, judges should not mess with it.
They should just discern it by sticking as closely as possible to what is
already there.
This image seems to make the judge a weakling: someone who
merely enunciates decisions made by others. But because in this
image it is only the judge who can discern the people’s will in the law,
it surreptitiously gives her great power: only the judge can enunciate
what the law really, correctly means.
This is the underlying image that judicial populist rhetoric
conveys. In reality, of course, there are no clear global settlements on
the meaning of most laws. And laws, like other linguistic products,
have no inherent meanings that precede interpretation.243 Legal
decisions are, instead, part of the ongoing democratic process of
contestation of meanings and effects.244 The judicial populist image
does not really ascertain the one true meaning of the law. It just lets
judges present themselves as merely mouthpieces for the people’s

243. Bernstein, supra note 133, at 568 –72.
244. Id. at 571–72.
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will, rather than as government actors whose decisions express
normative commitments and have effects on a diverse populace.245
Judicial populist writers create this underlying image through a
stable of rhetorical tropes and stock stories, routinely expressed in
syllogistic form. These stock stories do not reflect realities, and these
syllogisms’ premises do not support their conclusions. But through
repeated incantations in a familiar form, writers make judicial
populist tropes seem normal, legitimate, and even obvious. By
insisting that stock stories are true and purportedly minimalist
methods are uniquely legitimate, such writers utilize the same
rhetorical devices as their political populist cousins. This rhetorical
strategy allows them to avoid justifying their decisions on the merits,
while also denying the possibility of legitimate disagreement.
A. CLAIMING MINIMALISM
In the rhetoric of judicial populism, the best judging does the least
judging. Judicial populism thus claims a methodological minimalism
that leaves the law as much as possible in its natural state, and a policy
minimalism that exerts the smallest effects on the world around.246
Writers asserting methodological minimalism contend that
“more sources of interpretation tend to yield more interpreter
discretion.”247 Since, in this image, a judge is merely the mouthpiece
for the true law, less discretion is both a worthy and an attainable goal.
As Adam Samaha has noted, many legal commentators fear that
having too many sources can cause problems.248 One way to address
that is to justify the relevance of specific sources to a particular
situation. Judicial populist rhetoric, in contrast, places a priori
constraints on sources, denouncing other categories of evidence as
per se irrelevant and even illegitimate.249
Limiting sources might constrain discretion if limited sources
both provide all the relevant information and compel a particular
result. But given the complexity of many legal questions, that will
245. Barrett, supra note 53, at 2195.
246. Judicial populism’s normatively based claims to methodological and policy
minimalism can be distinguished from a more pragmatic legal minimalism that seeks
to avoid deciding on big issues in favor of incremental rulings limited to the case at bar.
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008).
247. Samaha, supra note 141, at 556.
248. Id. at 556.
249. This is, for instance, the bread and butter of textualism, which distinguishes
itself by repudiating information specific to the passage of a legal text. See supra Part
III.A.
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usually not be the case.250 A judge limited to a few sources may have
to fall back on guesswork, intuition, or preference.251 The problem
with cherry-picking, after all, is not the surfeit of cherries. Rather, the
problem is the option of using a hidden principle, a bad principle, or
no principle at all to choose among them.
Indeed, taking evidence into account may limit discretion, not
increase it, since a judge must justify her conclusions in light of more
data.252 Of course, information overload can leave an interpreter
confused or uncertain and require her to decide what is most relevant
and what it means.253 But refusing to consider potentially relevant
information involves as much discretion as agreeing to consider it.254
The real problem, though, is that claims to minimalism suggest
that eliminating judicial discretion is possible. In reality, judges must
draw conclusions without the benefit of clear rules that produce
obvious answers. The adversarial system itself, which brings
contested legal questions to court, implies as much. The question
should not be whether judges use discretion to interpret the law—
they do—but whether they justify how they use their discretion in
rational and normatively appealing ways. Contra judicial populist
attempts to deflect responsibility, there is no way for judges to leave
law unaffected. And given the judiciary’s central role in government,
there is little normative reason to ask them to try.
In practice, moreover, even legal writers who claim to limit their
evidence tend to leave a lot of sources on the table. The United States
Code; the common law; an evolving panoply of interpretive canons;
non-legal writings; not to mention research, theories, and intuitions
about anything from psychology to economics to physics—all are fair
game.255 This claimed minimalism, in other words, does not really
minimize. Rather, it inscribes preferences for particular evidentiary
250. See Samaha, supra note 141, at 615.
251. Id. at 558 (“As a logical matter, the notion that discretion increases as sources
increase is incorrect without more. Sometimes the opposite is true.”).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 261.
254. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1231–32 (2010) (“[J]udges who regularly
rely on the canons [approved by textualists] have license to employ a systemic kind of
discretion, in contrast to judges who regularly invoke legislative history or agency
deference.”).
255. See generally Bernstein, supra note 136 (discussing how the role of each of
these sources can lead to numerous different conclusions on the meaning of statutory
text); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1263 (2012) (noting that Supreme Court opinions routinely contain factual assertions
not substantiated by the record).
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categories, often ones not clearly relevant to the law at issue. There
are plenty of friends here to choose from.256
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., in which a prisoner on work
release sued the manufacturer of a machine that tore off his arm,
provides an example.257 The defendant manufacturer introduced
evidence of the plaintiff’s convictions, which were unrelated to his
work-related injury. Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) required that a
judge “shall” admit evidence of a witness’s prior conviction “only if”
its probative value outweighed “its prejudicial effect [on] the
defendant”—here, the manufacturer.258 If the evidence prejudiced the
plaintiff, the judge had to admit it. While this might make sense in
criminal cases, in civil suits it created a strange asymmetry that all
members of the Court rejected.259
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens took an exhaustive tour
through the history of felon testimony and the development of Rule
609.260 He concluded that the Rule’s drafters were consistently
concerned with potential prejudice to specifically criminal
defendants,261 and interpreted the rule to require balancing only
when evidence might prejudice criminal defendants, not litigants in
civil suits.262 In dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that the Rules do not
distinguish criminal from civil parties,263 and “themselves specify that
they ‘shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined’ in all cases.”264 Based on the Rules’ text, the dissent would
256. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg, The Paradoxical Impact of
Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1045–46, 1046
n.43 (2020) (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)) (“The most famous line critical of the use of legislative history . . . was
from Judge Harold Leventhal . . . who said that ‘the use of legislative history [was] the
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one’s friends.’”).
257. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
258. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (amended
1987, 1990, and 2011)).
259. See id. at 510–11 (concluding that because our law generally treats civil
litigants similarly, it was “unfathomable why a civil plaintiff—but not a civil
defendant—should be subjected to th[e] risk” of mandatory admission of damaging
evidence); id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 530 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 511–24 (majority opinion).
261. Id. at 522 (“To the extent various drafts of Rule 609 distinguished civil and
criminal cases, moreover, they did so only to mitigate prejudice to criminal
defendants.”).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 533 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102) (1975) (amended 2011)).
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have interpreted Rule 609 to require courts to weigh the probative
value against the prejudicial impact of prior conviction testimony on
any party.265
Justice Scalia concurred in the result,266 but rejected using Rule
609’s history,267 and ignored the Rules’ statement of purpose. Instead,
he maintained that, of the available options, interpreting “defendant”
to mean criminal defendant “[q]uite obviously . . . does least violence
to the text.”268 But along what metric? Are adjectives less violent than
nouns? If so, the majority wins: it inserts the adjective “criminal” but
keeps the noun “defendant.” Is increasing the word number violent?
Then the dissent is right: it can replace “defendant” with “party” and
be done with it. This supposedly minimalist approach would make
legal protection turn on whether English happens to use a single
lexeme or a noun phrase for some concept. Taking the claim to lexical
pacifism seriously makes it clear that this is a largely nonsensical, or
at least arbitrary, way to make legal decisions.
Perhaps writers taking this position actually mean that legal
interpretation should do the least violence to the meaning of the text.
But how would we know that meaning without interpreting the
provision?269 The Green majority sought that underlying meaning
from Rule 609’s history;270 the dissent, from the Rules’ statement of
purpose.271 Justice Scalia claimed that his interpretation accorded
with “the policy of the law in general and the Rules of Evidence in
particular of providing special protection to defendants in criminal
cases,” but gave no citation for either.272 The concurrence thus
rejected evidence about the provision’s evolution and relation to
surrounding text, unmooring itself from the kind of information that
might provide a sense of an underlying meaning.273 Instead, it decided

265. Id. at 530.
266. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing that reading the Rule to protect civil
and criminal defendants but not civil plaintiffs would be “absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional”).
267. Id. at 528.
268. Id. at 529.
269. This minimalist quest recalls the Russian fairy tale in which a wicked king
commands the protagonist to “go I know not whither, and fetch I know not what.” R.
NISBET BAIN, RUSSIAN FAIRY TALES: FROM THE SKAZKI OF POLEVOI 70 (3d ed. 1901).
270. Green, 490 U.S. at 511–24.
271. Id. at 530 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 529 (Scalia, J., concurring).
273. Id.
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for itself what the underlying meaning must be, based on “the law in
general”—whatever that is—and word counts.274
This minimalist approach imputes a core or underlying meaning
to a text. But those who employ minimalism also tend to reject the
kinds of evidence that could give them a sense of that underlying
meaning. So they are left to make it up for themselves. They obscure
their own role in the process by expressing their interpretation as a
premise, rather than the conclusion it is.275 This naturalizing rhetoric
makes it sound like the judge’s preferred meaning is part of the law,
rather than just another interpretation of it.
Policy minimalism, meanwhile, urges judges to minimize their
effects on the world in which they adjudicate. We saw this attitude in
Gill v. Whitford, where the Court confronted electoral districts
gerrymandered for partisan advantage.276 Chief Justice Roberts,
worried about wading in and deciding “whether the Democrats win or
the Republicans win,”277 implied that the Court should refrain from
affecting the status quo. Yet if the status quo violates the rule of law,
as the Gill plaintiffs argued, then not interfering is itself an important
policy choice. Announcing that federal courts cannot intervene in
partisan gerrymandering hardly leaves electoral policy in some
pristine, baseline state.
Consider also the dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon.278 The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to . . . take any” endangered
wildlife,279 defining “take” as, inter alia, “harm.”280 Regulations
interpreted “harm” to include “an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife,” including through “significant habitat modification or
degradation.”281 Commercial loggers argued that this regulation went
too far: the statute proscribed only “direct applications of force
against protected species” with intent to injure, not collateral damage

274. Id.
275. Others have noted related phenomena in the characterization of legal issues.
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
1311 (2002); Michael Coenen, Characterizing Constitutional Inputs, 67 DUKE L.J. 743
(2018).
276. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); see supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
277. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 37.
278. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
279. Id. at 690–91 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)).
280. Id. at 691 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)).
281. Id. at 691 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
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from habitat modification.282 The Sweet Home majority held the
agency’s interpretation of “harm” reasonable, while the dissent
thought “take” required purposeful action against an animal.283 As
William Eskridge has noted, the dissent rested on an assumption that
private property bestows an individual right against regulatory
incursions,284 a baseline that might make it outrageous for the
government to tell “the simplest farmer” what to do with his land.285
The majority treated the common law as largely superseded by
statutes and regulations, with government constraints on private
externalities already constituting the status quo.286 What constitutes
policy intervention, and what constitutes minimalism, differs
depending on the baseline one chooses.
For policy minimalism to make sense, there would have to be
some natural, pre-disturbance way that law acts and means things:
there must be a neutral baseline against which effects can be assessed.
But, as a fundamentally social enterprise, law has no before-the-fall
stage. Choosing a baseline is itself a political, not to mention an
interpretive, decision.287 Moreover, the nature of adversarial litigation
means that, usually, some legal principles argue for allowing the status
quo, others for stopping it; the court must decide what to do. Neither
option is policy-neutral, and neither leaves the law undisturbed.
Judicial populist rhetoric obscures this by treating some selected
baseline as though it were an objective fact.288
Policy minimalism also insists that judges not consider the effects
of their decisions: “[T]he avoidance of unhappy consequences” does
not provide an “adequate basis for interpreting a text.”289 In practice,
Jane Schacter has noted, those who decry considering consequences

282. Id. at 692–93, 697.
283. These opinions showcase judges’ discretion in choosing what text to
interpret. Bernstein, supra note 133, at 574–78. They have also become well-known
for their rapid-fire deployment of statutory interpretation canons. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 545–
49 (2013).
284. Eskridge, supra note 283, at 549.
285. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 698–708 (majority opinion).
287. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 43, 46–47 (1989) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was defined by “an oftstated desire to avoid judicial value imposition” which offers “a futile quest for value
neutrality” and “obscures . . . value choices” which are an inevitable part of judging).
288. Id.
289. Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2011)
(quoting Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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often do it anyway.290 But they ignore concerns identified by the
agencies that implement statutes and the legislatures that enact
them,291 acting instead like a “ventriloquist to a hypothetical
congressional dummy”292 to allow the judge himself to “identif[y] . . .
the policy baseline against which the range of plausible legislative
meanings is gauged.”293 Beyond this inconsistency, moreover, judging
in fact has consequences, and it seems at least normatively
problematic to ask judges to pretend to work outside of the polity they
help govern. Such minimalist claims smuggle in conclusions about
what the law is and should be, disguising those conclusions as neutral
premises and putting them off limits for reasoned debate in ways that
conflict with the commitments of a republican democracy.
Some might defend this kind of minimalism for at least yielding
consistent or predictable results, but it cannot accomplish even that.
Following through on originalism “would introduce random chaos
into the law,” since every time “new research shows that the original
meaning . . . is different than we had previously thought, . . . we must
upend our legal system” to accommodate the new findings.294 The
three contrasting textualist opinions in Bostock, meanwhile,
demonstrate the concomitant unpredictability of textualism.295 A
purportedly minimalist approach does not impose consistency; it
merely helps judges justify refusing to consider the consequences of
their inconsistencies.
The minimalism of judicial populist rhetoric echoes the language
of “passive virtues” associated most strongly with Alexander Bickel.296
290. Id. (“[P]olicy consequences . . . often . . . figure quite prominently in textualist
reasoning and method.”).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1013 (quoting Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1998)).
293. Id.
294. Andrew Koppelman, Why Do (Some) Originalists Hate America?, ARIZ. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at *25–26) (on file with authors).
295. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). See supra notes 159–67 and
accompanying text. Justice Alito’s dissent even takes a policy minimalist swipe at the
majority opinion: “[i]f today’s decision is humble, it is sobering to imagine what the
Court might do if it decided to be bold.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting).
296. “The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been the central obsession of
modern constitutional scholarship.” Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333, 334 (1998); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). Barry Friedman has shown that
Bickel jumped into a conversation about the proper role of the judiciary that had been
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But the two are quite different.297 The literature on passive virtues is
normatively thick: Bickel saw the courts as a moral vanguard, “the
pronouncer and guardian of [enduring] values,” not a value-neutral
umpire that reports on an inherent legal meaning.298 For Bickel, rather
than enabling majority rule,299 the Court should act as the custodian
and developer of society’s ongoing normative commitments, “us[ing]
whatever influence it possesses to bring principle and popular
opinion into greater alignment.”300 Its countermajoritarian position
gives it an “educative mission . . . helping to facilitate the slow but
deliberate reform of perception and attitude on which . . . moral
instruction depends.”301
Passive virtue theorists also recognize that discretion inheres in
judging, and they urge courts to use that discretion to principled ends.
Passivity is a leadership strategy: it’s not that passivity is the virtue,
but that virtue can be expressed in passive-seeming ways. Bickel
asked judges not to stick to an imagined baseline of core legal
meaning, but to gradually adjust legal and social norms by deflecting
highly fraught issues.302
Later commentators followed suit. Philip Frickey praised the
Court for using constitutional avoidance to deflate the excesses of
mid-century anti-Communism, avoiding head-on confrontation with
that era’s repressive trends while “defus[ing] political opposition
[and] incrementally adjusting public law to better respect individual
liberty.”303 William Eskridge argues that courts should facilitate
going on, in some way or other, since the founding of the Republic. Friedman, supra, at
340.
297. There is much to learn from and also to argue with in the voluminous passive
virtues literature, but we do not evaluate it or endorse any of its particular strands.
Our aim is to show that the mainstream of passive virtue thinking figures courts as key
participants in the normative development of the American polity, and urges courts to
act with an eye toward furthering normative ends. Judicial populism, in contrast,
disavows a normative role for courts and views normative considerations as irrelevant
and perhaps illegitimate in adjudication.
298. BICKEL, supra note 296, at 24; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1577 (1985) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 296,
at 24).
299. Kronman, supra note 298, at 1578–79 (contrasting Bickel’s philosophy with
that of John Hart Ely). For Bickel, elected representatives too are not “like animated
voting machines . . . to register decisions made by the electorate”; they ideally
represent diverse interests in a deliberative way. Id. at 1591 (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 183 (1965)).
300. Id. at 1581.
301. Id. at 1586.
302. Id. at 1581.
303. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
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“pluralistic democracy by enforcing neutral rules”304 that promote
broad participation in the political process,305 especially by groups
who face discrimination.306 Along with John Ferejohn, Eskridge
presents courts as custodians of a republican-democratic
ecosystem:307 as the institution “best situated to stand up for
fundamental values,”308 courts should “be deliberation-respecting” by
“listen[ing] to . . . other institutions”309 as they consider both practical
means—”what to do”—and normative ends—”what to want.”310 Cass
Sunstein asks courts to be alert to the practical consequences of their
actions, recognizing that “intense public convictions may provide
relevant information about the correctness of [courts’]
conclusions.”311 For those who theorize the passive virtues, courts are
stewards of public moral development, custodians who promote the
health of a variegated ecosystem—not hikers who try to leave no
trace.312
Judicial populist minimalism, in contrast, does not offer to
effectuate incremental improvements or moral stewardship. Instead,
it claims a principled refusal to consider the consequences of judicial
decisions.313 On this view, courts should not facilitate pluralistic
deliberation, provide moral leadership, or help out with governance.
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren
Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 401–02 (2005).
304. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1310 (2005).
305. Eskridge, supra note 304, at 1301–03.
306. Id. at 1284.
307. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture:
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (2009). Eskridge and
Ferejohn see judging as a “horticultural” project of tending to the Constitution’s
“shared project in a way that allows it to flourish and contribute to the larger public
interest,” rather than an “engineering” project of maintaining fidelity to the mechanism
that an original creator designed. Id. at 1273–74.
308. Id. at 1283 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
309. Id. at 1275.
310. Id. at 1278.
311. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159 (2007).
312. “The Court has many ways of ‘not doing.’” Kronman, supra note 298, at 1585
(quoting BICKEL, supra note 296, at 71). It should pursue them not because inaction is
the most legitimate option, but because inaction offers a good strategy for enacting
normatively desirable change in the long term. Passivity allows the courts to “create
the time for popular opinion to catch up before taking a principled stand.” Id. at 1586.
313. Cf. Schacter, supra note 289, at 1009 (examining, in contrast, textualism’s
often “strikingly consequentialist methods”).
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They can only voice underlying truths inherent in the law that lead
inexorably to particular conclusions by using the right methods. This
view evacuates judging of the normative considerations and moral
leadership that justify countermajoritarian courts in the eyes of
passive virtue theorists. Instead, it implies that judges can avoid the
countermajoritarian difficulty by enunciating the true will of the
unified people. Courts, in this vision, are legal bystanders to whom
normative values and human consequences should be irrelevant.
Legal writers can thus proclaim neutrality and universality, as though
refusing to acknowledge one’s commitments entailed not acting on
them.
Method and policy minimalism work together to help legal
writers avoid, and deny the validity of, normative and practical
concerns with the use of judicial power. The idea is that a righteous
judge who follows the properly minimalist method can be confident
of a minimalist policy outcome. Minimalism presents the law as
embodying a clear people’s will for the judge to enunciate, obscuring
the legal and practical effects of a judge’s inevitably discretionary
decisions.
Writers who use judicial populist tropes claim that
methodological minimalism leads to policy minimalism, which makes
their preferred methods uniquely legitimate. However, there is no
necessary connection between the breadth of interpretive methods
and the degree of their policy impact. And there is no untouched policy
position to be maintained. It may sound silly to state it outright, but
there is no interpretation that doesn’t interpret. And because laws
have practical effects, there is no legal interpretation that doesn’t have
policy consequences. Insisting on an illusory minimalism begs the
very policy questions that judges routinely—and unavoidably—
decide. Writers who use these tropes thus form the landscape in their
own image while claiming to leave no trace. Rather than drawing on
normative justifications for exercising passive virtues, they use what
we might call passive virtue signaling as a cover for reaching the
outcomes they want.
B. USING KEY TROPES AND STOCK STORIES
The judicial populist image of law does not comport with basic
democratic commitments to pluralism and institutional mediation,
and it runs headlong into the reality that neither legal language nor
policy effects have an untrammeled baseline state that judges can
access. Yet, through decades of persistent repetition, this image has
permeated legal discourse so much that it seems unobjectionable,
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sometimes even obvious. This image is propounded through a
collection of tropes: vehicles in which the imagery of judicial populism
travels. They give writers handy tools to avoid justifying positions on
the merits by insisting that good judging focuses on method instead.
They also help writers deflect and deny the possibility of legitimate
disagreement about what good judging entails. In short, these tropes
help legal writers present judicial populism’s highly contestable
image of law as though it were a simple fact.
To be clear, we do not criticize judicial populist writing for using
rhetorical tropes. Any claim to judicial legitimacy—indeed any
developed image of any aspect of law—will rely on tropes of some
sort. Rhetoric is, after all, the main means of action in legal reasoning.
Here we present the primary tropes that sustain the particular
rhetoric of judicial populism.
The trope of a unified people that issues clear electoral mandates
to authorized leaders who unequivocally inscribe the people’s will
into law implies that legal texts usually have one clearly correct
meaning rather than being multivalent or ambiguous.314 And if
ambiguity and multivalence are aberrations, disagreement about legal
meaning or methods should be too. A judge who means well and uses
the right methods should be able to reach the right understanding,315
which suggests that disagreement is likely inspired by bad faith.316
This anti-pluralist premise justifies dismissing competing views and
questioning the very notion that views could legitimately compete. It
allows writers to suggest that they can avoid the discretion inherent
in judging and act as neutral conduits for clearly ascertainable
truths.317 And it makes those who use other methods or reach other
314. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at 6 (“As we hope to demonstrate,
most interpretive questions have a right answer.”); Raymond M. Kethledge,
Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017) (“In my own opinions as a judge, I have never
yet had occasion to find a statute ambiguous.”).
315. See, e.g., Kethledge, supra note 314, at 320 (“For, in my experience at least, if
one works hard enough, all the other interpretations are eventually revealed as
imposters.”).
316. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to the Court’s “interpretive jiggery-pokery”); see also GORSUCH, supra note
121, at 116 (addressing “some of the sillier objections against originalism” and stating
that “I’m not making this up.”).
317. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the U.S.: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be C.J. of the United States)
(“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make rules, they apply them.”); GORSUCH,
supra note 121, at 10 (“A judge should apply the Constitution or a congressional statute
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conclusions available for description as elite activists imposing their
views on the people.318
This trope also marginalizes institutions designed to mediate
among divergent interests or viewpoints as necessarily corrupt or
illegitimate. Staffed by people who represent the interests of
particular groups rather than of the whole people, legislatures are
chaotic and inscrutable, agencies, unaccountable and corrupt.319 This
image also helps relieve judges of responsibility for considering the
purposes of laws or the effects of judicial rulings.320
The anti-institutionalist bent extends even to the institution of
the judiciary itself: this rhetoric often presents judges as though they
were removed from the production of law.321 Considering the social
effects of judging is portrayed as irrelevant and even illegitimate. This
innocuous-sounding view denies the reality of our legal system, in
which precedent influences the law’s effects and judges unavoidably
participate in making law what it is. In the populist vision, conversely,
the method is the justification. This abstracted approach uses judicial
populist rhetoric to justify the exertion of power without facing its
practical implications.
On an individual level, judicial populist tropes echo the
Manichean thrust of political populism in disparaging elites in favor of
regular folks of humble origin.322 Against an elite that would
as it is, not as he thinks it should be.”).
318. See, e.g., GORSUCH, supra note 121, at 112–13 (“[M]any living constitutionalists
would prefer to have philosopher-king judges swoop down from their marble palace
to ordain answers rather than allow the people and their [elected] representatives to
discuss, debate, and resolve them.”).
319. See supra Parts III.A, III.C; City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It would be a bit much to describe the result as ‘the very
definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324
(James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961))); Calabresi, supra note 222, at 62 (claiming that
Congress and federal courts “will carry out their duties with state and local political
preferences as their main concern, when the true claimant to the executive throne
would not do so”).
320. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 121, at 16–17 (emphasis omitted)
(“[T]he dutiful judge is never invited to pursue the purposes and consequences he
prefers.”).
321. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (claiming that the judiciary’s proper role in statutory interpretation is
merely to ascertain “what the law as enacted meant”); GORSUCH, supra note 121, at
314–15 (“It is the role of judges to apply, not alter, the work of the people’s
representatives.”).
322. Thus, for example, Justice Gorsuch—a graduate of Georgetown Prep,
Columbia University, Harvard Law School, and Oxford University—maintains that
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complicate things to impose their own views or benefit “others,” this
approach presents law and judging as simple, clear, and rule-bound—
an image undermined by the realities of legislation, regulation, and
litigation. Some particularly active proponents propound this view
through publications, speeches, and frequent references to fellow
travelers.323 Like an advertisement that increases name recognition,
this frequent repetition of “familiar formulations” helps make judicial
populist tropes feel normal and natural,324 despite their inconsistency
with democratic governance. As previous Parts elaborated, these
tropes can be deployed for any substantive end; they do not constrain
judicial decisions so much as give them a legitimating veneer. Thus,
this rhetoric gives writers a way to cast doubt on the legitimacy of
others without limiting their own options.
To convey these formulations, judicial populist rhetoric often
uses a respected format: the syllogism, which draws a logical
conclusion from several premises.325 This form, so familiar to legal
writers, helps make ideas feel natural and obvious by showing how
they arise logically from agreed-upon foundations.326
In judicial populist rhetoric, however, syllogisms can become
oddly deformed. They often suffer logical slippages, yielding
conclusions that do not actually follow from their premises.327 For
“[his] story has its roots in the American West and is the product of the people there.”
GORSUCH, supra note 121, at 11–15.
323. Justices Scalia and Gorsuch have been particularly active in seeking to
influence the broader legal and political culture, including by writing books aimed at
popular audiences. See generally id.; ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON
LAW, FAITH, AND A LIFE WELL LIVED (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017).
Both justices have also written judicial opinions in a demotic style designed to appeal
to a general public audience. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Justice Scalia’s Bottom-up
Approach to Shaping the Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 297, 313–15 (2016). Judicial
populism, like originalism, is thus a potentially powerful tool for “conservative
mobilization in both electoral politics and in the legal profession.” Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 545, 548 (2006); see also Greene, supra note 54, at 708–16 (discussing efforts
to “sell[]” originalism).
324. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 581, 597 (1989–90) (warning of “[t]he fallacy that passes for truth by the
mere frequency of its repetition” and recognizing that all humans “are comfortable
with familiar formulations” and “trained to follow what has been said before”).
325. See JAMES A. GARDNER & CHRISTINE P. BARTHOLOMEW, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE
STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4 (3d ed. 2020) (explaining
syllogisms).
326. Id.
327. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783,
785–99 (2017) (providing extensive examples from Justice Scalia’s writing).
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instance, some scholarship claims that because courts interpreting
law discuss original meanings, and our legal system is defined by what
courts do, our legal system is originalist.328 Originalism, as we have
noted, holds that original meanings are decisive to the interpretation
of law.329 But discussing original meanings does not necessarily make
them decisive. The premises may be true, but they do not support the
conclusion. Similarly, some argue that since law is enacted in texts and
courts interpret law, courts should limit their interpretations to legal
texts.330 Yet the fact that law is enacted into text does not determine
the scope of information relevant for understanding that text—one
might use dictionaries, legislative materials, and much else in that
task. Again, one could agree with the premises but reasonably come to
different conclusions. Putting the argument in syllogistic form helps
the conclusion seem logical and uniquely correct even when it does
not follow from the premises.331 It also makes it easy to accuse those
who accept the premises but reach different conclusions of bad faith,
as though they had abandoned obvious truths or basic legal
commitments.
Using unobjectionable premises to reach unsupported
conclusions also gives writers tools to avoid the inescapably
normative aspects of legal decision making. Many important
questions in law and politics, after all, involve complicated situations,
disputed propositions, meaningful nuances, competing normative
perspectives, and substantial uncertainty. We often lack clear
premises that lead to decisive solutions, and courts—like other
governmental institutions—often try to ameliorate conflict or work
toward resolutions. The rhetoric of judicial populism, in contrast, uses
syllogisms to deny that inherent complexity, insisting instead that
there are simple, indisputable truths that produce obvious, correct
conclusions. This rhetoric uses the familiarity of the syllogistic form to
create universal truths out of thin air, without the pluralistic
contestation that characterizes democracy.332 But giving an argument
the form of a syllogism does not make it correct, or even sensible. As
Noam Chomsky famously noted, a sentence can have a perfectly
328. See supra Part III.B (discussing original law originalism).
329. See supra Part III.B.
330. See supra Part III.A (describing the central claims of textualism).
331. See GARDNER & BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 325, at 4.
332. See BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 72
(William E. Connolly ed., 1993) (arguing that legal strictures do not resolve or end
democratic contestation over values and practices, but allow contestation to keep
going).
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grammatical form and yet lack meaning.333 Nonetheless, the syllogism
provides a handy rhetorical frame through which to assert
indisputable conclusions about inherently disputable issues.
C. THE “POPULIST” NATURE OF THIS RHETORIC
The rhetoric we have described invokes the same themes that
define populism in the political sphere, tailored for the legal context.
Its moralized anti-pluralism treats the law as a clear embodiment of a
unified people’s will subject to direct enunciation by a properly
discerning leader or judge.334 Its antipathy toward institutional
mediation presents judges as mere mouthpieces for this truth, rather
than as participants in ongoing multilateral interactions among many
interests, values, and commitments. And its Manichean imagery pits
restrained judges who use the proper method to serve the will of the
people against unconstrained judicial activists who promote the
agenda of an elite establishment. Its curt rejection of alternative
understandings or methods treats those who disagree as others—
enemies of the people—whose views do not count. Judicial populists,
like political populists, thereby claim the magic of legitimacy by fiat.
To make that claim, writers use the language of minimalism
conveyed through stock stories and fallacious syllogisms. Framing the
work of legal reasoning in this way helps such writers pretend that
basic questions of value have already been settled, obviating and even
delegitimizing normative debate. Having rejected disagreement, a
person employing judicial populist rhetoric can use some highly
malleable methods to arrive at more or less whatever conclusions
they choose, while perversely claiming greater legitimacy than those
who admit to being participants in the democratic process. Consistent
repetition by visible, authoritative figures helps such writers get
control over the terms of the conversation and discourages others
from using methods that do not conform to judicial populist demands.
Evidence of what legislators understood their legislation to effectuate,
consideration of evolving norms, recognition of policy consequences,
and frank discussion of ethical values—basic ingredients for securing
the consent of the governed and achieving democratic legitimacy—
have no place in a world in which legal disputes have correct answers
that judges simply deduce and enunciate. Judicial populist rhetoric
propounds an image of this fictional world to deny the possibility of

333. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (2d ed. 2002) (“Colorless green
ideas sleep furiously.”).
334. See supra Part IV.B.
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valid disagreement and to evade justifying its conclusions on their
merits.
V. TOWARD REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY IN LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
Political populism responds to real concerns: deep-seated
anxieties about liberal constitutional democracy, widespread political
alienation, resentment over growing inequality, and a belief that
democratic institutions neglect the concerns of ordinary people. But
rather than addressing those problems by alleviating inequality or
increasing participation, it undermines the functioning of democratic
institutions and delegitimizes democratic practices. Judicial populism,
too, responds to a liberal constitutional anxiety with unelected judges
exercising policymaking discretion.335 But rather than seeking to
justify judicial decisions on the merits, it claims to eliminate discretion
and reach objectively correct results through neutral methods. Both
discourses claim to put the people in charge, and both assert
legitimacy through indisputable, inherent rightness rather than
reasoned persuasion. But their claims are not true, and their ideals are
not desirable.
To evaluate populist discourse, we have used republican
democracy as a baseline. This Part takes its perspective directly. If
political populism harmonizes with judicial populism, what legal
approaches sing with republican democracy? Recognizing the
vagaries of judicial populism illuminates, through contrast, some key
ideals of democratic judging.
In contrast to populism, democratic judging embraces pluralism
of both perspective and method. Public officials like judges should
recognize that legal issues are subject to reasonable disagreement by
a diverse populace. They should provide reasoned explanations for
their decisions, striving to reach conclusions that could be accepted by
people with fundamentally competing views.336 That is, we think the
making and implementation of law in a republican democracy should

335. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319,
344–45 (1989) (discussing the “inability of philosophical ‘liberalism’ to provide a
satisfactory theory of judging”).
336. Reason-giving of this nature is central to legitimate decision making in a
democracy. See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD
POLITY 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009).
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strive to be not universalizing but inclusive: judges should consider
the interests and perspectives of those affected by their decisions.337
A pluralistic approach implies recognizing that challenging
problems often lack simple solutions and acknowledging, even
embracing, complexity.338 Eschewing specious claims to neutrality,
democratic judging accepts a greater responsibility: to exercise
judgment, consider competing arguments, and provide reasoned
justifications.339 Its goal is not conforming to some implausibly
neutral method but promoting the public good and avoiding arbitrary
domination.340
Democratic judging takes a multi-modal approach to legal
interpretation as well, seeing the methodological pluralism that
characterizes the federal judiciary as a strength, not a weakness.341
Courts should have flexibility to determine which kind of interpretive
guidance is most relevant in each case,342 considering “the full range
of relevant contexts” to determine which gives the best “evidence of
337. Administrative agencies are legally obligated to consider all the major policy
issues that were ventilated in their proceedings to avoid judicial invalidation of their
decisions on the grounds that they were arbitrary or capricious. See Donald J. Kochan,
The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability Through Public Participation, 70 OKLA.
L. REV. 601, 612–22 (2018). Judges, as public officials who affect how law works, should
do the same. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978) (discussing the central elements of legitimate adjudication).
338. Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (1997) (“[Administrative law] must
necessarily look to a plurality of institutions and practices [that contribute] to an
ongoing process of legitimizing the regulatory state.”).
339. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995) (recognizing the inevitability of
judicial discretion in statutory interpretation and arguing that courts should resolve
close cases in ways that will improve the functioning of democracy).
340. See generally Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory
Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2013).
341. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.”); RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 96–98
(2017) (recognizing that the Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation involves
interpretive pluralism, “a vision of constitutional decision-making characterized by the
absence of commitment to any particular interpretive theory”); see also Glen
Staszewski, Precedent and Disagreement, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1024–27 (2018)
(recognizing the affirmative value of interpretive pluralism in promoting democracy).
342. See Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 209, 248 (2015) (discussing the benefits of interpretive pluralism in statutory
interpretation).
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meaning.”343 In short, an anti-populist approach to judging involves
practical reasoning about law.344 Courts try “to derive a practical
solution in the specific case at hand” by considering “all useful and
relevant evidence[,]” a process in which “disagreement is embraced
rather than suppressed.”345 In a pluralistic environment, judging must
be an information-rich process.
Some might contend that claiming certainty is simply how judges
express themselves. We believe, in contrast, that providing reasoned
explanations—that neither speciously claim certainty nor deny the
validity of disagreement in contested cases—is itself a component of
democratic judging.346 And in practice, judges often demonstrate this
kind of tempered, inclusive reasoning, for instance, in opinions that
take into account the deliberations of administrative agencies,
legislatures, or expert bodies.347 Making reasoned decisions in the
absence of a single correct answer is part of the point of having courts
empowered to interpret and review the law.
In practice, judges routinely choose interpretive methods
without explicitly justifying their choice,348 implying that the methods
chosen lead to the most justifiable results in a particular case. The
assumption is that judges function in an information-rich
environment and must make decisions about the relevance and the
implications of different kinds of information. That leaves purportedly
minimalist methods no privileged place. Indeed, using minimalist
methods can undermine the pluralistic deliberation at the heart of
republican democracy. If minimizing the information they use means
rejecting evidence without evaluating its relevance, judges should
instead affirmatively justify using a purportedly minimalist approach.
343. Daniel L. Feldman, Should Judges Justify Recourse to Broader Contexts when
Interpreting Statutes?, 34 INT. J. SEMIOTICS L. 377, 380 (2020).
344. See Staszewski, supra note 340, at 271–76 (arguing that a practical reasoning
approach to statutory interpretation comports best with principles of republican
democracy). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
345. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 344, at 365; see Staszewski, supra note 342, at
247 (arguing that courts should reject simplistic interpretive rules that artificially
minimize ambiguity, restrict inquiry into lawmakers’ purposes, foreclose considering
interpretive consequences, or ignore changes since enactment); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
346. See, e.g., James A. Macleod, Reporting Certainty, 2019 BYU L. REV. 473, 480–83
(arguing that calibrating the level of certainty expressed is one important way judges
communicate with the public).
347. See Fuller, supra note 337; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
348. See generally Feldman, supra note 343.
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Also in contrast to populism, democratic judging recognizes that
popular sovereignty is exercised primarily through public
institutions; there is no “public will”—much less a single unified one—
independent of those institutions.349 “[O]ne cannot sensibly [think]
that ‘the People’ is some special sort of entity—whether comprising
all citizens or only a majority of them—with a will of its own that is
conceptually independent of and genetically antecedent to political
institutions.”350 Democratic institutions mediate competing views of
the good and the best way to get there;351 judicial pronouncements
inevitably participate in that process. So democratic judging does not
pretend that courts have no policy impact or can leave no trace on the
law.
Rejecting a view of the law as “static, given, autonomous,
seamless, and complete,”352 democratic judging seeks to make law
responsive.353 It encourages robust deliberation involving interested
parties, acknowledges its own effects, and justifies its decisions on
normative grounds. That is, rather than imagining a law abstracted
from its society, democratic judging recognizes that courts, like laws,
are embedded in social context and implicated in its well-being. This
advances republican democratic principles: it encourages reasoned
deliberation in the judiciary, promotes a responsive legal system,
provides a basis for evaluating and challenging judicial decisions, and
facilitates inter-institutional dialogue about collective problems.
Democratic judging justifies a decision not through claiming abstract
adherence to method but through showing its beneficial effects and
explaining why it can be acceptable to a range of competing views.
Understanding that popular sovereignty needs institutional
mediation also favors dispersing power and sharing authority across
institutions. After all, law in a constitutional republic is the result of an
ongoing dialogue among many actors—legislatures, executives,
349. Of course, social movements, non-government organizations, and a vibrant
private sphere also play a vital role in facilitating popular sovereignty. See, e.g., Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
927, 928 (2006) (exploring “the ways that principles and practices can draw each
other’s authority into question, and . . . the role that political contestation plays in
spurring those challenges.”).
350. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY 205 (Will Kymlicka, David Miller & Alan Ryan eds., 2002).
351. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 16–23 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield
ed., 1981).
352. West, supra note 111, at 120.
353. See NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 113, at 73–113 (presenting a “responsive”
vision of the rule of law).
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agencies, courts, publics—not an original speaker or an authoritative
expositor alone.354 Legal equilibrium is always up for grabs.
Republican democracy offers citizens, legislators, executive actors,
and judges opportunities to spur reform and enlist one another’s
cooperation; that is a strength. Concentrating authority in actors who
have the power to simply pronounce and entrench unilateral
decisions, conversely, undermines democratic functioning.
Democratic judging recognizes that institutions serve diverse
constituencies in different ways, and it seeks to head off
concentrations of power. By putting institutions at the center,
democratic judging can also candidly recognize that neither the
Congress that enacted a statute nor the writers who produced the
Constitution could resolve, or even foresee, every issue that becomes
the subject of litigation. Judicial decisions are thus an integral part of
the production of law, sometimes requiring courts to do some
“creative policymaking.”355 While courts should avoid outcomes in
tension with clear legal text,356 they should also reject artificial or
unrealistic limits on judicial discretion. Taking a pluralistic and
institutional approach, democratic judging routinely considers
lawmakers’ expectations and goals, changes in law and society, and
the consequences of judicial decisions, striving to use all relevant
considerations to reach the most justifiable decisions in each case.357
Finally, while judicial populism presents legal disputes as
Manichean conflicts pitting good judges and pure people against the
activists and elites who would oppress them, democratic judging
eschews hyperventilating about the disagreement inherent to
democracy.358 In contrast to populism’s habit of excluding the
354. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
355. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 344, at 345–47.
356. Critics often overlook the core legal process theory tenet that courts should
generally not interpret in ways that legal text will not bear. See Kevin M. Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 384–88 (2012) (describing “the
purposive technique”).
357. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–40 (1986) (arguing that
constitutional interpretation should both “fit[]” and “justif[y]” the relevant legal
context). Contra Dworkin, however, we caution against imagining a judge as a
Hercules: since legal questions often lack a single right answer, our courts lack a
Hercules able to divine it.
358. Popular constitutionalism, for instance, envisions constitutional
interpretation as the product of an ongoing multi-institutional dialogue involving a
broad range of people with diverse interests and perspectives; it typically seeks
greater inclusion. Popular constitutionalists take seriously social movements and
marginalized groups, but do not claim they speak for everyone. See, e.g., WILLIAM N.
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disempowered, the contestatory dimension of legal interpretation
provides a vital safeguard that promotes a more inclusive polity.359
We should, in short, embrace a legal theory fit for a republican
democracy: one that celebrates multiplicity, deliberation, and
provisional resolutions. That means using a variety of methods to
parse an information-rich environment and seek results that are
justifiable and broadly acceptable in a particular case. This admittedly
challenging enterprise advances the commitments of a republican
democracy. In fact, interpretive pluralism, practical reasoning, and
reasoned consideration of competing arguments are long-standing
aspirations in our constitutional democracy. One might even say that
these ideals tell the true story of our law.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary authoritarian populism is widely recognized as
pernicious in the political sphere. Its moralized anti-pluralism treats
disfavored members of the polity as enemies or outsiders whose
interests and perspectives do not count. It pretends that a single
leader can declare the people’s one true will outside of institutions
that mediate competing interests. Its Manichean stance treats critics
and rivals as enemies to be destroyed rather than as legitimate
adversaries. These moves are designed to delegitimize disagreement
and opposition in a way that is fundamentally at odds with the
commitments of republican democracy.
This Article identifies judicial populism as a related phenomenon
in contemporary legal theory. Judicial populist rhetoric likewise
ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(2010); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2010); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Chasing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014); Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373 (2007). The potential for ongoing and even vigorous disagreement
regarding the most justifiable understanding of the Constitution is, in fact, central to
such theories, and they thus tend to view constitutional decision making as at least
potentially provisional in nature. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra, at 383 (“One of the most
valuable things that occurs in response to a Supreme Court decision is backlash.”); Post
& Siegel, supra, at 373–74 (viewing “interpretive disagreement as a normal condition
for the development of constitutional law”).
359. See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 164 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1989) (discussing
the contestatory dimension of republican democracy); Staszewski, supra note 341, at
1025.
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insists on single correct answers to complex, debatable problems. It
disparages the deliberation, mediation, and negotiation that
characterize democratic institutions and rejects the multiplicity of
interests and perspectives that characterize a pluralistic democracy.
It simplifies legal issues and interpretive methods to assert a
privileged access to the one true meaning of law. And, like its political
counterpart, it treats reasonable disagreement, opposition, or
criticism as fundamentally illegitimate.
Despite its fundamentally undemocratic nature, judicial
populism has become accepted in mainstream legal theory.
Committed originalists populate the judiciary and legal academy; it
has become almost trite to observe that “we are all textualists now”;360
and the Court is increasingly sympathetic to unitary executive
theory.361 Perhaps most strikingly, the rhetorical success of judicial
populism has put proponents of other approaches on the defensive, as
though judicial populism had a presumptive claim to legitimacy.
But judicial populism is just as undemocratic as the broader
populist movement in the United States. It should certainly not be
ceded the moral high ground and allowed to win the “interpretation
wars” by declaration.362 Its purported minimalism secretly privileges
the judge’s personal preferences and rejects appropriate normative
considerations, while providing no single correct answer. Its
internally incoherent methods do not offer neutral mechanisms for
finding the truth of a law or the will of a people.
We should reject judicial populism and its claims to unique
legitimacy and embrace instead practical reasoning and interpretive
pluralism. That means encouraging reasoned deliberation and open
dialogue rather than an implausible minimalism that obscures judicial
discretion and legal effects. It also means acknowledging the
provisional nature of legal determinations and asking judges to justify
360. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303 (2017); Schacter, supra note 289, at
1008 (quoting Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism & Contextualism in Administrative Law,
78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057) (1998) (“It has become somewhat common for observers
. . . to proclaim that ‘we are all textualists now.’”).
361. The Court has also edged ever closer to major doctrinal reforms that could
deconstruct the regulatory state. See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (holding that the CFPB’s structure, which included an individual
director who could only be removed from office “for cause,” violated the separation of
powers); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that the SEC’s administrative
law judges are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Appointments Clause).
362. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 117, 118–20 (2009) (evaluating recent claims that textualism has won “the
interpretation wars”).
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their decisions on the merits, not pretending that courts stand outside
our law-making system or that rigid methods yield correct answers to
complex problems. We should, in other words, reject judicial populism
in favor of republican democracy in legal interpretation.

